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Abstract
This dissertation consists in three essays that share as a common motivation
the study of economic policy in models of general equilibrium. A brief sum-
mary is presented below.
Ch.1 Perfectly competitive markets for sovereign bonds that carry default
risk are characterized by what we label as the non-exclusivity externality: when
the ownership of debt is anonymous and dispersed, the equilibrium price of
new debt on the primary market might be too low to avoid default, even
though preventing default would be in the interest of existing creditors. We
show that a policy maker can solve this externality ex-post, but the benefit ex-
ante depends crucially on the ability of the government to tax bond holdings.
Ch.2 This chapter studies a stylised RBC in a model where credit markets are
subject to adverse selection. On the normative side we show that competitive
equilibria are constrained suboptimal when hidden information problems are
severe. On the positive side, we show that a purely informational shock that
shifts the distribution of firms subject to asymmetric information, might be an
important driver of business cycle fluctuations.
Ch.3 We analyse how different types of monetary policy regimes and con-
straints affect debt limits, defined as the maximum level of debt an economy
can service. We find that a more reactive monetary policy stance generally
raises the debt limit, by reducing the inefficiencies linked to inflation fluctua-
tions. On the other hand the ZLB negatively affects debt limits by amplifying
the fall in tax revenue and muting the decrease in the interest rate. We then
show that making debt limits endogenous to monetary policy considerations
has important consequences on the transmission of fiscal policy shocks.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Non-exclusivity externality in
Sovereign bond markets
1.1 Introduction
The recent European sovereign crisis has called for unconventional and un-
precedented policy responses to overcome a long period of fiscal distress, fi-
nancial turmoil, and uncertainty. With the introduction of various programs
and policies,1 the European Central Bank (henceforth ECB) aimed to inject liq-
uidity to banks and to intervene in sovereign debt markets with the explicit
goal of stopping the dangerous spiral in spreads on sovereign bonds and pro-
tecting bondholders’ interest. The sovereign crisis has generated discussion
among policymakers and researchers over the merits and risks of these poli-
cies.2
Given the relevance of the European sovereign crisis, the recent literature
has investigated possible causes of market failures and explored possible pol-
icy solutions. One strand of the literature has rationalized the scope of inter-
vention policies in the bond market with the aim of preventing a self-fulfilling
crisis. This line of research has been pioneered by Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
1For example the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Financial Sta-
bilisation Mechanism (EFSM), and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
2Examples of work that evaluate the effects of ECB policies are Merler, Pisani-Ferry, et al.
(2012), De Pooter, Martin, and Pruitt (2012), Eser and Schwaab (2012), Altavilla, Giannone,
and Lenza (2014), Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015), Falagiarda and Reitz
(2015), and Szczerbowicz et al. (2015), among others.
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and includes works by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), Lorenzoni and Werning
(2014), Broner et al. (2014), Corsetti, Dedola, et al. (2016), De Grauwe and Ji
(2013). In a nutshell, the basic idea is that the economy can be stuck in a bad
equilibrium caused by investors’ pessimistic expectations and policy interven-
tion is able to revert the economy to a good equilibrium by acting as a lender
of the last resort and providing deposit insurance. Another strand of the lit-
erature has explored the degree of inefficiency created by the debt dilution
problem; as discussed in Bolton and Jeanne (2009), Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2013), Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sosa-Padilla (2016), the debt-dilution prob-
lem is caused by the government’s lack of commitment not to decrease the
value of debt issued in the past by issuing new debt.
In this paper we propose an alternative and novel reason that justifies pol-
icy interventions in sovereign bond markets, by showing that perfectly com-
petitive markets for sovereign bonds that carry default risk are characterized
by an additional externality. In fact, in a competitive market, in which the
ownership of debt is anonymous and dispersed, the equilibrium price of new
debt on the primary market might be too low to avoid default, even though
preventing default would be in the interest of existing creditors. For example,
if that bond is issued by a sovereign country that is on the verge of default, the
price would intrinsically be low. Borrowing at a high interest rate will, in turn,
speed up that country’s default decision. This prospect is unwelcome by exist-
ing bondholders since they would like, if they could, to offer better borrowing
conditions to the troubled economy in order to delay default. In a competitive
market, however, existing bondholders are not able to affect the bond price.
This externality, which we label as non-exclusivity externality, arises because of
the existence of a large number of atomistic lenders. In fact, if there was only
one lender in the market this externality would disappear. As pointed out by
Hellwig (1977) in a more general setting, credit granted to a single borrower
is not a homogeneous good, since later loans affect the return on earlier loans.
Therefore an existing creditor is able to extend new loans at conditions that
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nobody else would be willing to accept. At the endogenous debt limit, the ex-
pected present value of returns to new lenders becomes negative, even though
the value for existing lenders remains positive, and additional loans are prof-
itable only because they improve previous loans. An important consequence
of this externality is that the endogenous debt limit for the sovereign economy
that borrows in competitive markets is much lower than the one implied by
eliminating the externality.
Three are the contributions of our paper. First, we highlight the presence
of the non-exclusivity externality in a standard incomplete market for sovereign
bonds. Second, we define a policy intervention that addresses this external-
ity and we highlight the ex-post equilibrium properties. Third, we investigate
the ex-ante properties of the equilibrium that includes the intervention, with
particular emphasis on the welfare implications. The main result is that while
the policy intervention is ex-post Pareto improving, its ex-ante welfare impli-
cations crucially depend on the fiscal policy used to finance the intervention.
Nevertheless, we show that there is a set of fiscal policies that obtain an ex-ante
Pareto improvement.
Let us first summarize our framework. There are three agents in the econ-
omy: a peripheral country, international investors, and a policy maker. (i) A
peripheral country starts in a recessionary state and finances its consumption
streams issuing long-term bonds. Stochastically, the exogenous income even-
tually jumps to a good state, in which it will remain forever. However, if the
recession is long lasting the government might accumulate too much debt and
it will optimally default. In this case, it stops interest repayments to bond-
holders and it will remain in financial autarky until the recession is over. At
that point it will repay the investors after a renegotiation of the debt burden.
Hence, the problem of the peripheral economy is standard and it is in the same
spirit of the endogenous default framework as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
(ii) Risk neutral international investors buy sovereign bonds in a perfectively
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competitive market and bear the risk of a loss due to the government’s insol-
vency in case of default. Their optimal decision results in an equilibrium bond
price. (iii) Finally, a policy maker might decide to implement a policy, which
will be described in details below, which offers to the peripheral government
the possibility to borrow at more favourable conditions, in order to extend in-
terest repayment to bond holders. The intervention is budget-balanced and
financed by levying taxes to bondholders.
The policy intervention in our framework works as follows. When default
comes, the policy maker can solve the non-exclusivity externality by subsidizing
new lending to the small open economy. The size of the subsidy, and therefore
the bond price after the policy implementation, is chosen so that the periph-
eral country is indifferent between defaulting and continuing to borrow at the
policy price. As a consequence, the small open economy can borrow at bet-
ter conditions than the one offered by competitive investors absent the policy.
This way the government can delay default and continue to repay bondhold-
ers. We also assume that the cost of the policy is financed by taxes levied to
investors. Therefore, the policy maker runs a balanced budget. We show that
this type of intervention is, at the moment of its implementation, Pareto im-
proving. In fact, investors are better off because the benefits obtained by the
increased probability to receive a full repayment of their existing loans exceeds
the expected loss from financing the intervention. Hence, the policy is able to
eliminate the non-exclusivity externality that characterizes the competitive bond
market. In addition, we show that the policy intervention has always a limited
duration. In fact, after the policy starts, if the recession continues to last, the
authority needs to give always better and better condition to keep the periph-
eral country away from default. As a consequence, the tax burden for investors
rises and eventually it is such that it perfectly counteracts the benefit of the in-
tervention. At that point the intervention stops, and the peripheral country
defaults.
Next, we characterize the ex-ante equilibrium. In fact, when the possibility
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of the intervention is known, the bond price will reflect the benefit/cost of
the future possible interventions. Specifically, we show that the ex-ante bond
price is generally higher than absent intervention, since the value of the bond
carries the information that claims are insured by the policy intervention. As a
consequence, bond prices increase and the actual intervention is delayed since
the peripheral country is now able to borrow from the market at a relative low
cost. This prediction is in line with the empirical evidence that highlights the
effects of the ECB announced programs on reducing sovereign spreads and
the increased debt levels of troubled economies. Interestingly, the size of the
appreciation of the bond price crucially (inversely) depends on how strongly
the tax burden implemented to finance the intervention targets bond holdings.
The final part of the paper concerns welfare. Is the policy ex-ante welfare
improving? The first step to answer this question is realizing that the ex-ante
welfare of investors and of the peripheral country are both a function of the
size of the bond price appreciation caused by the policy. However, while the
country’s welfare is an increasing function of the size of the appreciation, in-
vestors’ welfare is a decreasing function. Intuitively, if the policy causes an
ex-ante large appreciation of the bond, the country can enjoy much better mar-
ket borrowing condition and, therefore, higher consumption. However, in this
case the fact that the market is willing to offer good borrowing condition de-
lays the actual policy intervention, which, eventually, occurs when the country
level of debt is rather large and the ex-post benefits for investors become small.
Then, we show that there exists a set of fiscal policies that, by targeting strongly
enough bond holding, make the intervention ex-ante Pareto improving. Recall
that relaxing the extent to which the tax to finance the policy targets bond hold-
ings increases the bond price appreciation ex ante. This appreciation creates a
transfer from investors’ welfare to the peripheral country’s welfare. There are
sets of fiscal policies that are Pareto-efficients and that are linked to financing
the intervention by taxing somewhat aggressively bondholders; in contrast,
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when attenuating too much the dependence of taxes to bondholding, the in-
tervention leaves investors worse off. For example, a policy that is financed
via lump-sum taxes is never Pareto improving.
The final comment concerns the essence of the policy intervention that ad-
dresses the non-exclusivity externality, which is fundamentally a transfer from
existing creditors (who pay the taxes) to new investors that underwrite bonds
on the primary market (who enjoy the subsidy). Whereas a subsidy on invest-
ment is a policy that is not controversial as it can be easily implemented using
market instruments, the ability of the policymaker to tax bondholding could
be disputed. Nevertheless, once the mechanism is clear, it is then easy to think
to alternative arrangements that can lead to the same outcome. Similarly to
our policy, we can think that a credit line is provided directly by an interna-
tional institution that finances the intervention through taxes. Alternatively,
we could think to more nuanced contractual arrangements. For example, we
can think to a complex seniority structure that, after some debt level, gives pro-
gressively increasing seniority to new bondholders, or equivalently that debt
is progressively restructured conditional on the country continuing to borrow
from the market.
1.1.1 Related Literature
We have already mentioned that a contribution of our paper is to provide an
additional rationale for policy interventions in the sovereign bond market, in
addition to the equilibrium selection motive as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015),
Lorenzoni and Werning (2014), Broner et al. (2014), Corsetti, Dedola, et al.
(2016), De Grauwe and Ji (2013), and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and the
debt dilution problem as in Bolton and Jeanne (2009), Chatterjee and Eyigun-
gor (2012), Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sosa-Padilla (2016). The non-exclusivity
externality we introduce in this paper is in the same spirit of Hellwig (1977),
although in his framework debt limits are exogenous whereas in our setting
they are endogenously determined by the optimal default decision.
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The non-exclusivity externality can coexist with, but is independent from,
the debt-dilution externality. Interestingly, the solution for solving the debt-
dilution externality is rather different to the one that mitigates the externality
in our paper. In fact, Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sosa-Padilla (2016) show that a
way to eliminate the debt-dilution problem features a tax on debt for the bond-
issuing country that benefit long-term holders. In our framework, instead, we
show that investors themselves are willing to finance a policy that eliminates
the market failure, as it will become clear later.
Our paper can be related also to Hatchondo, Martinez, and Padilla (2014),
which shows that a sovereign model a la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) can ac-
count for what they label “voluntary debt exchange", i.e. episodes in which
both the government and its creditors are likely to benefit from reductions in
the government’s debt burden. In their setting the debt exchange is ex-post
beneficial, but it can be ex-ante detrimental. Although the welfare implications
of their policy is similar to the one found in this paper, the reasons underlying
the results are very different. In fact, our model can be interpreted, instead,
as a “voluntary interest rate reduction", which cannot be implemented by the
market but that can be only implemented by a policy that solves a pecuniary
externality proper of a competitive market in which the ownership of debt is
dispersed. We also show that absent initiatives to coordinate creditors, the
government defaults at a sub-optimally low level of debt and policies aimed
at solving this externality may largely reduce spreads and extend borrowing
limits.
It is also important to highlight what our paper and our results are silent
about. Our welfare analysis considers only the direct effects of solving the non-
exclusivity externality, while we ignore other indirect channels that possibly af-
fect the overall welfare of the economy. For example, lower sovereign spreads
may have a beneficial effect on the real economy, through the link between
sovereign bonds and the balance-sheet of the banking sector, as highlighted
in Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014), and in Popov and Van Horen (2015),
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among others.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 1.2 we introduce a
simplified two period model to highlight the mechanism driving the external-
ity. In section 1.3 we outline the general environment in continuous time. In
section 1.4 we describe the competitive equilibrium. In section 1.5 we describe
the policy intervention and its ex-post properties. In section 1.6 we discuss the
ex-ante equilibrium properties. In section 1.7 we characterize the ex-ante wel-
fare implications of the policy. In section 1.8 we conclude with final remarks.
1.2 Two-period Model
The economy lasts two periods: t = 1, 2. A representative agent (henceforth
government) in a peripheral country issues non-contingent bonds to smooth
her consumption. In period 1 the economy has low endowment, y1 = yL.
In period 2 the endowment could be either high, y2 = yH, or low, y2 = yL,
respectively with probability p and 1− p. The country starts with a level of
asset B1 < 0, which means that the country has some initial debt. The gov-
ernment utility function, denoted with u(·), is increasing, concave, and sat-
isfies the standard Inada conditions. We assume a logarithm utility function
u(c) = log(c), where c denotes consumption. The concavity of the utility func-
tion, together with the assumption that the period-2 income might be higher
than the period-1 income, provide borrowing incentives for the government.
The government can default on its debt in period 1 or in period 2 provided that
endowment is low. However, we assume that the government cannot default
if income is high. This assumption aims to capture in a reduced form the fact
that it might be too costly for the government to default in a boom, so that a
high income realization effectively acts as a commitment technology not to de-
fault. We indicate with 1Dt the default decision at time t, where 1
D
t = 1 denotes
default and 1Dt = 0 denotes repayment. Default implies no penalty other than
exclusion from financial markets.
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As standard, we assume that atomistic foreign creditors have access to
an international credit market in which they can borrow or lend as much as
needed at a constant international interest rate, which we assume to be zero.
They have perfect information regarding the economy’s endowment process
and can observe the level of income every period. Creditors are assumed to
price defaultable bonds in a risk neutral manner such that in every bond con-
tract offered they break even in expected value.
The problem for the government is:
max
{c1,c2,B2,1D1 ,1D2 }
log(c1) +E log(c2) (1.1)
s.t. c1 + qB2 = yL + (1− 1D1 )B1, (1.2)
B2 = 0 if 1D1 = 1, (1.3)
c2 =
yH + B2, prob = pyL + (1− 1D2 )B2, prob = 1− p. (1.4)
Some remarks are in order. First, without loss of generality we have assumed
that there is no discounting from period 1 to period 2. Second, q denotes the
bond price. Third, defaulting in period 1, i.e. 1D1 = 1 implies that the gov-
ernment does not repay its initial debt, B1, and that it is excluded from the
financial market so that in that case necessarily B2 = 0.
1.2.1 Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 1. A Competitive Equilibrium for this economy is defined as a set of
policies for consumption in period 1, c1, and in period 2, c2, for government’s
asset holdings B2, a default decision in period 1 and period 2, 1D1 and 1
D
2 , and
a bond price q, such that:
1. Taking as given the bond price q, the government’s asset holdings and
default decisions satisfy the government optimization problem.
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2. The bond price, q, being consistent with creditors’ expected zero profits,
reflects the government’s period-2 default probability.
3. Taking as given the government policies, consumption satisfies the re-
source constraint.
To characterize the competitive equilibrium, we solve the model by back-
ward induction. Notice that defaulting in period 2, i.e. 1D2 = 1, simply implies
that the government will not repay its debt and no further penalties occur. As a
result, the government will default in the low income state every time B2 < 0.
Formally, we can state:
Lemma 1. If B2 < 0 and y2 = yL, then 1D2 = 1.
It is easy to show that, given our setup, the consumption smoothing motive
of the government implies that if he starts with some legacy debt in period 1,
B1 < 0, it will never choose to run a budget surplus. This is true because, even
though the bond price is so low that the government does not find convenient
to borrow further, B2 ≥ B1 is strictly dominated by defaulting and implicitely
set B2 = 0. Hence the following must be true:
Lemma 2. If B1 < 0, then B2 ≤ 0.
Equipped with these two results, we can characterize the optimal default
decision in period 1. The value of not defaulting in period 1 is
VND1 (B1, q) = maxB2
log(yL + B1 − qB2) + (1− p) log(yL) + p log(yH + B2).
(1.5)
Notice that we have used the fact that Lemma 1 together with Lemma 2 imply
1
D
2 = 1. Solving for B2, gives the optimal asset/debt position:
B∗2(B1, p) =
p
q (yL + B1)− yH
1+ p
. (1.6)
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If instead the government defaults in period 1, its value, VD1 is:
VD1 = log(yL) + (1− p) log(yL) + p log(yH). (1.7)
In a competitive market the bond price is equal to the period-2 probability
of repayment, which is the probability to obtain a high income realization;
therefore, q = p. Hence, the government will optimally default wheneven
VD1 ≥ VND1 (B1, p). We are now ready to prove the main proposition that char-
acterizes the competitive equilibrium: there exist a threshold B¯1 such that if B1
is above that threshold the government does not default in period 1, while if
B1 is below the threshold, the government defaults in period 1.
Proposition 1. In a competitive equilibrium ∃!B¯1 < 0 such that: B1 ≤ B¯1 ⇐⇒
11(p, B1) = 1.
Proof. In the competitive equilibrium q = p and the period-1 default condi-
tion is: VD1 ≥ VND1 (p, B1). The optimal asset decision, evaluated at q = p is:
B∗2(p, B1) =
(yL+B1)−yH
1+p . Substituting into the non-default value in period 1 and
doing some simple algebra, the government decides to default if and only if:
log(yL) + p log(yH)
1+ p
≥ log
(
yL + pyH + B1
1+ p
)
. (1.8)
Assume B1=0, by Jensen’s inequality, the concavity of the logarithm function
implies that equation (1.8) is not satisfied and therefore a necessary condition
for the government to default is that B1 < 0. Since the RHS of (1.8) is mono-
tonically increasing and continuous in B1, there exists a unique threshold
B¯1 = (1+ p)
(
yLy
p
H
) 1
1+p − (yL + pyH) < 0
such that the government defaults if and only if B1 ≤ B¯1.
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1.2.2 Non-Exclusivity Externality
We now show that the competitive market is characterized by an externality.
Assume that the initial level of debt is B¯1, and the government, being at the in-
difference point between defaulting and not defaulting, will default in period
1. In this case, existing lenders are going to lose their investment. Indeed, since
debt is non-exclusive and lenders are atomistic, they cannot affect the competi-
tive price q = p. Notice, in fact, that the reason why the country will default in
period-1 is because the country can only borrow at a price q = p. Everything
else equal, better borrowing conditions would avoid default. In this section we
show: (i) that agents in the economy would all be better off if the bond price
was slightly higher than the market price; and (ii) how to simply implement
that price.
First, we can show that the value of non-defaulting in equation (1.5) is a
positive function of the bond price q.
Lemma 3. B1 < 0⇒ ∂V
ND
1 (B1,q)
∂q > 0.
Proof. By the envelope theorem, taking the derivative of (5) with respect to the
bond price, we get
∂VND1 (B1, q)
∂q
= − B
∗
2 (q, B1)
yL + B1 − qB∗2 (q, B1)
The denominator yL + B1− qB∗2(q, B1) from the government budget constraint
is equal to c1 which must be greater than zero because of the Inada conditions.
Then B∗2(q, B1) < 0 implies that the value of non-defaulting is increasing in the
bond price.
Since by definition of B¯1, VND1 (B¯1, p) = V
D
1 , then V
ND
1 (B¯1, p + δ) > V
D
1 .
Therefore, if the country faces the price p + δ , ∀δ > 0 the government would
not default, it would stay in the market and optimally borrow the quantity
B˜2 =
p
p+δ (yL+B¯1)−yH
1+p .
3
3Notice that B˜2 < 0 only when δ <
p(yH−yL−B1)
yH
, which puts an upper bound on δ.
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Country’s Welfare. Obviously, the country is better off under the new price.
Let’s define as Wc(p+ δ)−Wc(p) the government’s welfare differential. Since
VND1 (B¯1, p + δ) > V
ND
1 (B¯1, p) = V
D
1 , then:
Wc(p + δ)−Wc(p) > 0.
Old Investors’ Welfare. Now let’s look at existing period-1 creditors. Under
competitive price q = p, they will lose all their investment, and therefore their
payoff is equal to zero. Under the alternative price p + δ, they will get back
their investment −B1 > 0. Given that they are risk neutral, their welfare gain
from the higher price is:
WoldI(p + δ)−WoldI(p) = −B1 > 0.
New Investors’ Welfare. Now let’s look at new investors. First recall that
the economy will default surely if in period-2 the realization of income is low.
Hence, if new investors buy the bond price at q˜ = p + δ, they would make an
ex-ante loss, equal to
WnewI(p + δ)−WnewI(p) = −δ(−B˜2).
The competitive market, per-se, cannot support a price higher than p. How-
ever, it can be implemented by introducing a simple subsidy to acquire new
issuance of bonds, which can be financed by taxing old investors. Recall, that
old investors enjoy a rather large welfare gain if the equilibrium market price
of the bond is higher than p. Indeed, the fact that default ivs a binary choice
generates a discontinuity in the payoff to old investors.
Assume that old investors subsidize the purchase of new bond issuance
and the subsidy for unit of bond is equal to δ. We will show that under this
transfer the market can sustain a Pareto improving outcome.
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Proposition 2. The competitive equilibrium is suboptimal. There exists δ¯ such that
for δ ∈ (0, δ¯] a Pareto improvement over the competitive equilibrium can be obtained.
Proof. The equilibrium price of the bond under the subsidy is: q¯ = p + δ. In-
vestors internalize the subsidy and break even in expectation. The welfare of
the country is increasing in δ since the new price relaxes the government bud-
get constraint. Are existing investors now willing to finance the subsidy? With
a strictly positive subsidy δ, the country will not default. Their welfare gain
from introducing the subsidy is:
WoldI(p + δ)−WoldI(p) = −B11δ>0 − δ(−B˜2)
The first term is the revenue in period 1 that occurs only when δ is strictly
positive, since only in that case lenders will get back their original investment;
the second term is the cost of the transfer, which is equal to the unit cost of the
subsidy, δ, and the total amount of new bond optimally sold by the country
and acquired by new investors, equal to −B˜2. Using (2) and taking the limit as
δ→ 0, we have that
lim
δ→0
[
WoldI(p + δ)−WoldI(p)
]
= −B1
This discontinuity and the fact that the welfare gain is continuous in δ prove
the result
Figure 1.1 shows the welfare of existing investors as a function of δ. At
the competitive price, q = p, and therefore δ = 0, existing investors make
a loss since the country defaults. A price higher than p creates a jump on
welfare since the country will not default and investors will be repaid. Then,
the higher is the unit subsidy, the higher is the cost for investors, since not only
the unit subsidy obviously increases, but also the amount of issued bond B2
increases, since the country will optimally demand more debt when borrowing
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conditions improve. Importantly, our result shows that small deviations from
the competitive price q = p are Pareto efficient since both the country and old
investors are better off, while new investors are indifferent.
FIGURE 1.1: Existing investors’ welfare as a function of the sub-
sidy δ
This two-period model shows the heart of the non-exclusivity externality:
the competitive market cannot price the incentives of old investors to avoid
default and that results in a loss in efficiency. However, this simple model can-
not answer interesting questions related to the proposed solution for the ex-
ternality, such as whether the policy is effective over longer horizons, whether
default will be always avoided under such a policy, and what are the ex-ante
effects of the policy once investors are aware of it. In order to answer these
questions we now introduce a more complete infinite horizon model in con-
tinuous time.
1.3 Continuous time model
The Peripheral Economy and Uncertainty. A representative agent (hence-
forth government) in a peripheral country issues non-contingent bonds to smooth
her consumption. The consumption smoothing desire is motivated by the un-
certainty about the exogenous income that the government is facing and that
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is the only source of uncertainty in the economy. We assume that time is con-
tinuous and the income process Yt follows a continuous-time Markov chain, as
conventionally defined, i.e.:
Definition 2. Continuous-time Markov chain. A continuous-time Markov chain
with finite or countable state space Y is a family {Yt = Y(t)}t≥0 of Y-valued
random variables such that:
(a) The paths t 7→ Y(t) are right-continuous step functions; and
(b) For all t ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, i ∈ Y , j ∈ Y ,
P (Y(s + t) = j|Y(s) = i, {Y(u) : 0 ≤ u < s}) = P (Y(s + t) = j|Y(s) = i) .
Condition (a) guarantees that the Markov chain makes only finitely many
jumps in any finite time interval. Condition (b) is the natural continuous-time
analogue of the Markov property. It requires that the future is conditionally
independent of the past given the present.
More specifically, we assume a two-state process, i.e. Y = {yL, yH}: here yL
denotes a bad state in which income is low and yH > yL denotes a good state
in which income yH is high. In the initial period, t = 0, the economy is in the
bad state (recession): the government is poor and needs to borrow to finance
consumption and satisfy coupon payments. Eventually the country recovers
and jumps to the good state. However, the time in which the country exits
the recession is uncertain. Once the country recovers, uncertainty is resolved
and the country will remain in the good state forever after. These assumptions
impose restrictions on the infinitesimal generator matrix that governs the tran-
sition of the process. It can be shown that the transition probability matrix in
this case is:
P(t) =
e−λt 1− e−λt
0 1
 ,
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with initial condition y(0) = yL. The key remark is that the time of the jump
from the low to high income, which we define as T j, has exponential distribu-
tion with parameter λ.
We have, therefore, a two-stage game. In stage-1, the prospect of an income
increase provides a motive for borrowing. Uncertainty is then fully resolved
at some random date at which point we enter stage-2 and the government
receives a constant stream of income yH.
Remark 1. This setting, which is consistent with Hellwig (1977), allows us to derive
analytic results. Assuming an absorbing high income state is not a key limitation,
since we are, anyway, mainly interested in the dynamics during the low income state,
which are obviously the main drivers of sovereign crisis and monetary intervention.
Asset Structure. The government issues non-contingent bonds. These bonds
have coupons that decrease at a continuum rate δ. Hence, a bond issued at t
promises to pay the sequence of coupons:
ke−δ(s−t), ∀s ≥ t,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) and k > 0. We normalize and set k = δ+ r, so that the bond
price is equal 1 when the risk of default is zero at all future dates, and where
r is the assumed risk-free rate in the economy. This well-known formulation
of long term bonds is useful because it avoids having to carry the entire distri-
bution of bonds of different maturities (see Hatchondo and Martinez (2009)).
A bond issued at t− j is equivalent to e−δ(t−j) bonds issued at t, so the vector
of outstanding bonds can be summarized by a single state variable bt, which
is equal to total debt in terms of equivalent newly issued bonds. The param-
eter δ controls the maturity of debt, with δ = 1 corresponding to the case of
short-term bond and δ = 0 corresponding to the case of a consol.
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Government and Default. We allow for the government to endogenously
default on its debt obligation. A key simplifying assumption for our analy-
sis is that default can occur only when income is in the low state. Hence, by
assumption we rule out default when the economy exits the recession phase.
As it will be clear throughout the paper, we will focus our analysis mainly in
the recession state, since it is arguably the time in which policy intervention
is meaningful; hence, we believe that simplifying the dynamics of the model
in the high income state does not bear a large cost.4 We assume the following
sequence of events: if the government defaults, which always happens when
income is still in the low state yL, the government stops any coupon repay-
ment and the country is excluded from the financial market so that the econ-
omy lives in autarky. When the recession is over, which means when income
jumps to the higher state yH, the government renegotiates debt payments by
repaying only a fraction φ ∈ [0, 1] of outstanding debt, and it gains back access
to financial markets.
We denote with T the default period. In the next section we characterize
the choice of the optimal time of default; here we describe the constraints the
government faces. There are two cases, then: (i) either the country jumps out
of the recession at a time, T j, which occurs after the time of default, T and the
country defaults on its debt; (ii) or default never happens. In the first case,
4This assumption, which allows us to derive analytical results, is in line with the vast em-
pirical literature on sovereign defaults that links default episodes to periods of recession. Us-
ing quarterly data for 39 developing countries over the 1970-2005 period, Yeyati and Panizza
(2011) show that defaults are associated with deep recessions; Tomz and Wright (2007) anal-
yse defaults in a longer sample,1820-2004, and, although they find evidence that defaults also
happens without severe recessions, the maximum default frequency occurs when output is at
least 7 percent below trend. Hence, we believe that assuming no defaults in the good state of
the economy is quite realistic. One can relax this assumption by assuming an output cost of
default and a risk of returning to the low state of the economy after the jump to the high state.
This setting would be more similar to standard business cycle endogenous default models as
in Arellano (2008), which requires numerical solutions.
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T j > T: the government budget constraint is:
c(t) + q(t)
[
b˙(t) + δb(t)
]
= yL + (r + δ)b(t), for t < T and for a given b(0),
c(t) = yL, for T ≤ t < T j,
c(t) + q(t)
[
b˙(t) + δb(t)
]
= yH + (r + δ)b(t), for t ≥ T j and with b(T j) = φb(T).
The first equation states the resource constraint prior to the default. c(t) de-
notes consumption at time t, b(t) denotes asset holding, b˙(t) denotes the in-
stantaneous change in asset position, q(t) is the bond price. The second equa-
tion indicates that the government is excluded from the financial market from
the time of default, T, to the time in which it enters in the good economic state,
T j. The third equation describes the budget constraint from the time of the
jump onwards. Two things are worth noticing; first, when the economy re-
gain access to the financial market it starts with a renegotiated level of debt,
b(T j) = φb(T);5 second, since by assumption after the jump no default will oc-
cur, then q(t) = 1, ∀t ≥ T j, because we have normalized the price of a risk-free
bond to unity.
In the second case, T j < T, there is no default, and the government budget
constraint is:
c(t) + q(t)
[
b˙(t) + δb(t)
]
= yL + (r + δ)b(t), for t < T j and for a given b(0),
c(t) + q(t)
[
b˙(t) + δb(t)
]
= yH + (r + δ)b(t), for t ≥ T j.
Investors. The economy is populated by a continuum of mass 1 of risk neu-
tral atomistic and homogenous investors, which operate in a competitive fi-
nancial market, and, therefore, take the bond price as given. Let a(t) de-
note each investor’s individual bond holdings, which, in our economy, are the
counterpart of governments’ bond, so that in equilibrium we will have that
a(t) = −b(t). Denote with V(·) the investor’s value of asset holding. Then,
the investor’s problem at any time t before the jump and before default, i.e.
5Recall that in our notation b(t) denotes asset level, so that at debt is negative asset holding.
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∀t < min{T, T j}, is:
V
(
a(t)|{q(s)}Ts=t
)
= max
{a(s)}Ts=t
∫ T
t
(−q(t)(a˙(s) + δa(s)) + (r + δ+ λ)a(s)) e−(r+λ)(s−t)ds+
+V (a(T)|q(T)) e−(r+λ)(T−t). (1.9)
We assume that investors cannot short sell the bond and face the following nonegativ-
ity constraint
a(t) ≥ 0, ∀t.
The integral captures the value of a bond throughout the uncertain times in
which the economy is in a recession and the government might default at time
T; in this time interval, the investor can increase her asset holding position at
the price q(s), with t ≤ s ≤ T, and this investment returns the coupon repay-
ment, r + δ, as well some capital gain in case the economy jumps in the higher
income state, event with arrival rate λ. Notice, in fact, that the assumption
about the income process makes yH an absorbing state and, therefore, once
the income has jumped in that state the government will never default, and,
therefore, q(t) = 1, ∀t ≥ T j. On the contrary, default risk while income is
low, implies that q(t) ≤ 1, ∀t ≤ T. Finally, the last term captures the value of
the bond in case the government defaults, which includes future repayments
when the economy exits financial autarky and renegotiates the debt payments.
Our setting leads to some straightforward results:
Proposition 3. Bond Price. The bond price q(t) satisfies the following conditions:
1. For any period before default/jump, that is ∀t < min{T, T j}, the law of motion
of the price q(t) satisfies:
q˙(t) = (r + δ+ λ)(q(t)− 1),
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2. The bond price at default, q(T), is:
q(T) =
φλ
r + λ
.
This price is also the market price in any period between default, T, and the time
of the jump to the high income state, T j.
3. For any period after the jump, that is ∀t ≥ T j, the law of motion of the price
q(t) satisfies:
q(t) = 1, (1.10)
See Appendix A.1 for the proof. Condition 3 follows directly from the as-
sumption that the government cannot default in the high income state. Hence,
after the jump to the high income state occurs, the sovereign bond is equiva-
lent to a risk-free asset. Condition 2 relates the price of the bond at an instant
prior to default directly to the recovery rate of the bond, φ, and to the prob-
ability that the bond will be paid in full, which is linked to the probability λ
that the country obtains a good realization of income in that instant. Condition
1 is the non-arbitrage condition derived for risk-neutral investors acting in a
competitive market. Conditions 1 and 2 are at the heart of the non-exclusivity
externality. In a competitive market investors are price takers, they are willing
to underwrite a new bond only if the price is lower or equal to the present
value of future repayments on that specific bond. A new bond can never be
sold at a higher price even though that higher price may increase the value
of existing bonds. That is because it is individually rational for each existing
bondholder, being atomistic and anonymous, to shun the new issuance try-
ing to free ride on the increase in value of the bonds already in its portfolio.
Essentially it is as if bonds are priced by new investors at each point in time.
As it will be clear later, this feature, when combined with market incomplete-
ness generates a pecuniary externality that makes the government default at
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an inefficiently too low level of debt.
1.4 Debt and Price Equilibrium Dynamics
In this section we characterize the equilibrium path of debt, bond price, and
default time resulting from the government’s optimization problem. As de-
scribed before, the government starts with low income yL and with instanta-
neous probability λ income jumps to the higher level yH, at which point un-
certainty is resolved and the government receives yH forever after.
The value at the jump. Let us first derive the value of the government after
uncertainty is resolved, i.e. when income jumps to the absorbing high state. In
order to obtain analytical results, we assume that the instantaneous utility is
u(c) = log(c) and that the risk-free rate in the economy is equal to the discount
factor, r = ρ. These assumptions imply that after the jump, since there is no
uncertainty, the government will optimally maintain a constant consumption.
If the government has not defaulted prior to the jump, the problem is:
W j
(
b(T j)
)
= max
{c(t)}
t≥Tj
∫ ∞
T j
e−ρ(t−T
j) log(c(t))dt
s.t. b˙(t) = yH − c(t) + (ρ+ δ)b(t)− δb(t),
where we have used the fact that after the jump q(t) = 1, ∀t ≥ T j. The solution
of this trivial problem gives the value at the moment of the jump, that is:
W j
(
b(T j)
)
=
log(yH + ρb(T j))
ρ
.
If the government has already defaulted prior to the jump, the problem is
identical beside the fact that at the moment of the jump the country reenters
the financial market with a level of assets that it is a fraction φ of its obligation
at the moment of default, b(T). Hence, it will start the period of the jump T j
with a level of assets equal to φb(T).
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Therefore, defining with x the starting level of assets at the time of jump T j,
we can conveniently write the value of the government at T j as:
W j(x) =
log(yH + ρx)
ρ
with:
x = b(T
j) if T j ≤ T,
x = φb(T) if T j > T.
(1.11)
The value at default. If the government defaults at time T, then it will remain
in autarky consuming the low level of income until the period of the jump, at
which point it enjoys the value W j(φb(T)) as measured above. Hence, the
value function at default as a function of the level of asset b(T) is:
Wd(b(T)) =
log(yL) + λW j(φb(T))
ρ+ λ
(1.12)
Government problem prior to default. We are now ready to write the prob-
lem of the government, its value, and its default decision, when it faces a low
income and has not yet defaulted. The government takes the path of the bond
price as given and it chooses optimally the path for consumption {c(s)}Ts=t and
the optimal time of default T, as follows:
W(b(t)) = max
{c(t)}Ts=t,T
∫ T
t
e−(ρ+λ)(s−t)
[
log(c(s)) + λW j(b(s))
]
ds+ (1.13)
+Wd(b(T))e−(ρ+λ)(T−t), (1.14)
s.t. b˙(t) =
1
q(t)
(yL − c(t) + (ρ+ δ)b(t))− δb(t), (1.15)
q˙(t) = (ρ+ δ+ λ)(q(t)− 1), (1.16)
q(T) =
λφ
λ+ ρ
, (1.17)
b(t) given.
The first constraint is the resource constraint of the government. The second
constraint is the evolution of the bond price that follows from the investors’
problem. The third constraint is the equilibrium bond price at time of default.
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The continuous time Euler equation that characterize the equilibrium is:
c˙(t)
c(t)
=
λ
q(t)
[
c(t)W jb(b(t))− 1
]
, ∀t ≤ T, (1.18)
where W jb(·) denotes the derivative of the function W j(·) with respect to b. See
Appendix A.2 for the formal derivation.
Terminal conditions. The dynamic differential equation in (1.18), together
with the differential equation for b˙(t) coming from the government resource
constraint in (1.15) and the evolution of the bond market price for q˙(t) in (1.16),
pins down the optimal path of consumption and asset holding, given the ter-
minal conditions for the three variables. Deriving these terminal conditions in
the context of free terminal time boundary value problems is well established. A
formal derivation is provided in Hartl and Sethi (1983) and applied in Hellwig
(1977) in a similar context.
In our case, the system of the three terminal conditions, for b(T), c(T), and
b˙(T) is:
log(c(T))− log(yL) = λ
[
W j(φb(T))−W j(b(T))
]
−Wdb (b(T))b˙(T) (1.19)
c(T) = yH + ρφb(T), (1.20)
b˙(T) =
ρ+ λ
λφ
[yL − c(T) + (ρ+ δ)b(T)]− δb(T). (1.21)
See Appendix A.3 for the formal derivation
The first equation should be interpreted as a trade-off in the time dimen-
sion and pins down the default time. The left hand side represents the benefit
of delaying default of one instant, which stems from the possibility to con-
sume more than in autarky. The right hand side represents the cost of delaying
default of one instant, which is composed by two terms: (i) the foregone op-
portunity to default in case the jump occurs at that instant, which is a function
of the arrival rate, λ, and of the renegotiation parameter φ; and (ii) the disutil-
ity to increase the debt burden. The second equation pins down the quantity
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of consumption and debt at default. The solution of this system of three equa-
tions in three unknown, b(T), c(T), b˙(T), determines these terminal values.
Competitive Equilibrium. We are now ready to define a competitive equi-
librium for the economy, prior to the default or jump.
Definition 3. A Competitive equilibrium is a bond price sequence {q(t)}Tt=0, a
saving sequence {b(t)}Tt=0, a consumption sequence {c(t)}Tt=0, and an optimal
default time T for the peripheral government, and an asset holding sequence
{a(t)}Tt=0 for investors, such that, given {q(t)}Tt=0 :
(i) investors solve the problem in (1.9).
(i) the government solves problem in (1.14)-(1.17).
(i) the government defaults at T, if T < T j.
(i) bond markets clear, i.e. b(t) = −a(t), ∀t.
Once again, for convenience, we focus on the equilibrium for any t <
min{T, T j}, since this is the relevant case for which the policy intervention is
meaningful. It is trivial to define and derive the equilibrium condition in those
cases: the bond price after default or after the jump are described in Propo-
sition 3, whereas the government budget constraints are described in Section
1.3. Since these cases are not relevant for the scope of the paper we omit their
formal description.
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Hence, the equilibrium before default is characterized by the following sys-
tem of differential equations:
q˙(t) = (ρ+ δ+ λ)(q(t)− 1), ∀t ≤ T
q(t)b˙(t) = yL − c + b(t)[ρ+ δ(1− q(t))], ∀t ≤ T
c˙(t)
c(t)
=
λ
q(t)
[
c(t)W jb(b(t))− 1
]
, ∀t ≤ T
q(T) =
λφ
ρ+ λ
,
c(T) = yL + ρφb(T),
log(c(T))− log(yL) = λ
[
W j(φb(T))−W j(b(T))
]
−Wdb (b(T))b˙(T),
b(0) given,
where W j(·) and Wd(·) are defined respectively in equation (1.11) and (1.12).
The competitive equilibrium is then obtained as a solution of a well-known
problem in physics and engineering, called boundary value problem. Intu-
itively, given the solution for the terminal conditions at T, the solution of the
system finds a path for the b˙(t), c(t), q(t), and therefore for b(t), that links
the terminal conditions to the given initial value b(0) through the equilibrium
path.6
In Figure 1.2 we plot the equilibrium path of the bond price q(t) and of the
government’s level of asset to output, b(t)yL , and consumption, c(t). To visualize
how the economy can reach the default stage, we assume that the recession is
long lasting and income does not jump to the high state before default. Dur-
ing the recession, in order to keep a roughly steady level of consumption, the
government must issue bonds. While debt increases, default incentive rises
and investors continuously devalue the bond. In turns, a lower bond price
requires a larger amount of debt to finance consumption. This vicious circle
6A numerical solution for the boundary value problem can be computed in matlab using
the function bvp4c.m. As standard for non-linear system, it is not trivial to prove the existence
and the uniqueness of the solution. Nevertheless, for any calibration of the model we have
tried, we were able to always find a unique numerical solution.
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continues until the bond price reach the level q(T) = φλρ+λ , at which points the
government defaults.
FIGURE 1.2: Bond Price and Debt before Default
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Note: this graph plots the competitive equilibrium path of the bond price (top-left panel), the level of
asset as a fraction of output (bottom-left panel), peripheral economy’s consumption (top-right panel) and
function ICC (bottom-right panel), as a function of time (x-axis).
1.5 Policy intervention and Ex-Post Equilibrium
In this section, we show that a balanced budget policy intervention, paid by
investors, can improve the market outcome. We first focus on the equilibrium
ex-post and show that at default, existing creditors would be better off by ex-
tending credit to the country at a better price than the market price in order to
delay the time of default. We propose a simple and tractable policy that incen-
tivizes new investors to do so. We will then discuss which alternative policies
could reach the same goal. In the next section we extend the analysis to the
case ex-ante and show how the intervention has a significant impact on bond
prices and default thresholds.
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Policy The policy we consider is a subsidy on lending financed by taxes on
investors. A policy maker sets a subsidy g(b) per unit of bonds underwrit-
ten on the primary market. Since the subsidy is internalized by competitive
investors, in equilibrium the borrowing government will be offered a price
equal to:
qp(b) = q(b) + g(b) (1.22)
where qp is the bond price on the primary market and q is the bond price on
the secondary market that in equilibrium will depend both on the subsidy and
on the type of tax used to finance the policy. Notice that, for convenience,
our notation now implies the current level of asset holding (debt), b, as a state
variable. Since there is a monotone relationship between asset holding and
time, one can map a level of asset holding b with the time t at which that level
is reached. We denote the time at which the policy starts with TP and from
now on we express the problem in recursive form.
Remark 2. It is important to understand, as it will be clarified later, that by chang-
ing g(b) and the tax rule, the policymaker is able to implement any qP(b) she likes.
Therefore, with a slight abuse of notation, in order to simplify the exposition, we will
sometime refer to qP(b) as a policy instrument.
Let G(b) be the gross subsidy, which is also the total cost of the policy, i.e.:
G(b) = −g(b)(b˙ + δb), (1.23)
which simply states that the total cost of the policy is the product of the per-
unit loss and the quantity of new bond issuance. We assume that the interven-
tion is financed with a balanced budget by levying taxes on all investors:
G(b) =
∫ 1
0
τ(i, b)di, (1.24)
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where τ(i, b) is a generic function that summarizes the tax rule applied to an
investor i.
How does the policymaker set the subsidy? We postulate a subsidy g(b) ≥
0 that makes the borrowing government indifferent to default or keep bor-
rowing. This means that, by construction, the policy makes the borrowing
government ex post as well off. We then show in the next section that, once
accompanied with an optimal stopping time, this policy actually makes cred-
itors always better off ex-post and is, therefore, Pareto improving. Formally,
we consider a policy-maker that sets qP at each point in time in order to make
an optimizing government indifferent between continuation and default. The
policy can be determined by the solution to the following problem:
(r + λ)W(b) = max
c
log(c) + λW j(b) +Wb(b)b˙,
s.t. qpb˙ = yL − c + b[ρ+ δ(1− qp)],
W(b) = Wd(b). (1.25)
Taking first order conditions, we obtain a system of three equations in three
unknowns (c, b˙, qP):
log(c)− log(yL) = λ(W j(φb)−W j(b))−Wdb b˙, (1.26)
qP
c
= Wdb (b), , (1.27)
qPb˙ = yL − c + b[ρ+ δ(1− qP)]. (1.28)
Given b, the system pins down the policy functions c(b), b˙(b), qP(b). The first
two equations determine the government indifference condition between bor-
rowing and defaulting, while the last equation is the standard government’s
budget constraint. Notice that the equations (1.26)-(1.28) are identical, at T, to
the terminal conditions (1.19)-(1.21).
The following Proposition characterizes the solution of the dynamic system
(1.26)-(1.28).
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Proposition 4. Let us denote with b˙(b) the solution of the saving rate as a function
of the level of assets resulting from the system (1.26)-(1.28). And assume a solution
of the non-linear system above does exist. If b(T) < 0, then there is a unique stable
steady state at which the dynamic system (1.26)-(1.28) converges and all the variables
remain constant. Moreover, the intervention is characterized by a bond price qP(b)
that is monotonically decreasing in b or, equivalently, monotonically increasing in
time.
See Appendix A.4 for the proof.
The investors’ gain and the length of intervention The solution of the dy-
namic system presented above ignores investors’ incentives. Is this type of
intervention beneficial for investors? And if so, for how long? On the one
hand, bond holders might gain from the government delaying default, but, on
the other hand, they have to finance the policy by paying taxes. In this section
we quantify the net gain of investors from the policy and, consequently, we
pin down the duration of the policy intervention.
The Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman equation of a representative investor who
holds the entire stock of debt until maturity and underwrites any new bond
issuance is:
(r + λ)V(−b) = −G(b) + q (b˙ + δb)− (r + δ+ λ)b−V−b(−b)b˙,
where we have now incorporated the fact that the cost of the policy, G(b),
is a burden for investors. Substituting the expression for G(b) in equation
(1.23), and using the budget constraint of the government post intervention in
equation (1.28), the expression simplifies to:
(r + λ)V(−b) = (yL − c− λb)−V−b(−b)b˙. (1.29)
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At each point in time, the authority has the option to stop the policy. In that
case the government defaults and investors recover
Vd(−b) = −q∗b
where q∗ = φλr+λ is the expected recovery value for each bond as defined above.
Provided that a debt level b∗ and corresponding time TE does exist at which
the authority has incentive to stop the intervention, the terminal conditions
related to investors’ Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman that need to be satisfied at
the optimal stopping time are:
V(−b∗) = Vd(−b∗),
V−b(−b∗) = q∗,
The first condition is a value matching condition and states that at the margin
the value of keep lending to the government should be equal to the value of let-
ting the government default. The second is a smooth pasting condition: if value
functions do not smooth paste at b∗, then stopping at b∗ cannot be optimal. Bet-
ter to stop an instant earlier or an instant later. Therefore, a policymaker that
takes into account investors’ utility, and therefore taxpayers’ utility, will keep
lending to the peripheral country as long as the policy satisfies the following
incentive compatibility condition (ICC, henceforth):
−(ρ+ λ)q∗b ≤ yL − c− λb− q∗b˙, (1.30)
which is obtained by substituting the two conditions above into equation (1.29),
and realizing that (1.30) holds with inequality for any b > b∗ and with equal-
ity for b = b∗. The left hand side is the value of letting the country default at
the debt level b, while the right hand side is the value of keep lending to the
government and let it default one instant later. The condition therefore states
that the authority will extend loans as long as the value of delaying default
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for one instant in time is greater than the value of letting the country default
immediately. Simplifying, we define the function ICC(t) as:
ICC(t) ≡ yL − c(t)− λb(t)(1− φ)− φλ
ρ+ λ
b˙(t). (1.31)
Hence, investors gain from the intervention as long as ICC(t) > 0, and the
stopping time for the policy is the period TE such that ICC(TE) = 0.
We can show the following results:
Proposition 5. The Ex-post intervention.
1. If b(T)<0, then at T the intervention is Pareto optimal, that is ICC(T) > 0. In
this case, the policy keeps the peripheral economy indifferent and makes investors
strictly better off.
2. The length of intervention is limited. Specifically, there exist TE < T¯, where T¯ is
the time a steady state would be reached, that is b˙(T¯) = 0, such that ICC(TE) =
0 and ICC(t) < 0, ∀t ≥ TE, so that the incentive compatibility constraint is
not satisfied after TE. Then, at TE the authority stops the intervention and the
peripheral economy defaults.
See Appendix A.5 for the proof.
Proposition 5 states two important results. The first one is that at the mo-
ment of intervention investors are better off than if the government was left
to default. Hence, the intervention is Pareto improving.7 The benefit of the
intervention stems from solving the non-exclusivity externality. The second one
relates to the length of the intervention and answer the question: for how long
investors are better off? The length of intervention depends on how the cost
for taxpayers grows with respect to the benefit. The statement (2) implies that
the cost increases faster so that the intervention is always bounded in time. We
can provide an intuition for this result. Recall that the cost of the intervention,
G(·), is financed by investors, and it is proportional to the distance between
7Recall that by construction the policy leaves the peripheral country indifferent. Hence,
since investors are better off, then the policy is Pareto improving.
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the policy price qP(·) and the market price q(·), since that distance is also the
expected loss on each unit of new bond financing. Now, if qP(·) is low enough,
then the cost of the intervention is relatively small and, therefore, investors’
intervention gain that comes from delaying default exceeds its fiscal cost. On
the contrary, if the policy price qP(·) is too high, the fiscal cost of default might
exceed the benefit and the authority needs to stop the intervention since it is
not anymore Pareto improving. But recall also that by Proposition 4 the policy
price is always increasing, which means that to keep the peripheral country
as well off, the authority needs to offer continuously better condition. Soon
enough the fiscal burden for investors become large enough that the interven-
tion is not anymore beneficial for them, the policymaker stops the policy, and
the government defaults.
This mechanism reveals an interesting balance of power. If the peripheral
country has large incentives to default, then the authority is forced to offer a
high bond price, which is very costly for taxpayer and the intervention will be
very short. On the other hand, if the peripheral country has small incentives
to default, the intervention is relatively cheap and the investors’ are happy to
finance the government for a longer time waiting for the good output outcome
to realize.
Figure 1.3 plots the dynamics of the bond price q(t), government’s as-
sets b(t)yL and consumption c(t), and of the function ICC(t) that measures the
marginal gain of the policy intervention for investors. When the time of in-
tervention TP arrives, the policymaker offers an upper sloping price for the
government’s bond. Better borrowing conditions for the government are wel-
comed by long-term investors that would have otherwise lost part of their in-
vestment due to the upcoming default. At this conditions the government is
happy to stay in the market, continuing to borrow and increasing its consump-
tion, while investors are better off since they will continue to receive the inter-
est repayments and default is at least delayed. If the recession is long-lasting,
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so that the country does not jump to a better state of the economy, the pol-
icy continues but become more and more costly for investors. At the time TE
the benefit of the intervention is exactly counterbalanced by that cost, there is
no anymore marginal gain for investors to continue to finance the policy, and,
therefore, the policymaker stops the intervention, and the country defaults.
FIGURE 1.3: Bond Price and Debt before Default
Note: this graph plots the competitive equilibrium path of the bond price (top-left panel), level of asset as
a fraction of output (bottom-left panel), peripheral economy’s consumption (top-right panel) and function
ICC (bottom-right panel) as a function of time (x-axis).
The setting provided in this section, in which as soon as default time arrives
and the market for bond disappears the policymaker intervenes and imposes
its condition, is extremely useful to understand how the policy works. How-
ever, this setting does not take into account the market reaction to the policy
announcement. We tackle this issue in the next section.
Discussion on policy implementation The policy design that we proposed
is instrumental to the purpose of highlighting the pecuniary externality at the
heart of the problem. Our policy is indeed a transfer from existing creditors to
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new investors that underwrite bonds on the primary market in the current pe-
riod. It is this transfer that, by decreasing the interest rates for the borrowing
government, gives incentives to the government to borrow further. A sub-
sidy on investment is a policy that is not controversial as it can be easily im-
plemented using market instruments. More controversial is be the ability of
the policymaker to tax bondholding, in particular when bondholding are dis-
persed and held internationally. This casts some doubts on the feasibility of the
intervention, in particular because absent the possibility to tax bondholders in
a distortionary manner, if anticipated, the policy can be ex-ante detrimental, as
we show in the next section.
Once the mechanism is clear, it is then easy to think to alternative arrange-
ments that can lead to the same outcome. Similarly to our policy, we can think
that a credit line is provided directly by an international institution that fi-
nances the intervention through taxes. Alternatively, we could think to more
nuanced contractual arrangements. For example, we can think to a complex
seniority structure that, after some debt level, gives progressively increasing
seniority to new bondholders, or equivalently that debt is progressively re-
structured conditional on the country continuing to borrow from the market.
1.6 Ex-Ante Analysis
The previous section was useful to show that in our framework there is a scope
for policy intervention and to explain what are the characteristics of the pol-
icy when it is in place. The government may default because the bond price
offered by the market is too low and existing investors cannot coordinate to
provide a better price. We proved that in this case a policymaker that internal-
izes the interests of existing creditors has always incentive to intervene ex-post
and to extend credit to the government, thus eliminating the non exclusivity
externality. We also proved that, however, the policy is limited in time, since
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investors’ gain from providing additional financing declines to zero. Never-
theless, ex-ante the market reacts to the existence of the policy, since the bond
price will incorporate the benefits of future policy intervention. In this section
we show that: (i) ex-ante the bond price generally increases ; (ii) as a con-
sequence, the endogenous debt level at which the country would default, is
higher than absent policy.
Ex-ante Market Bond Price. First, we investigate how the value of a bond
changes when the policy intervention, in the form we have explained in the
previous section, is common knowledge. Investors have perfect information
about the details of the policy; hence, they are perfectly able to compute the
bond value accounting for the intervention. We assume that the policy is fi-
nanced by a linear combination of a lump-sum tax, which taxes each investor
i independently of asset holdings, and a proportional tax per-unit of asset. We
can then define the aggregate tax revenue T(t) as
T(t) ≡
∫
i
ai(t)τ˜(t, α)di +
∫
i
τ(t, i, α)di (1.32)
where τ˜(t, α) is the tax per unit of asset and τ(t, α) is the lump-sum tax per
agent-investor i. The policy rule is indexed by a parameter α, which is the
ratio of the tax revenue collected through the proportional tax over the total
tax revenue (notice, that we do not impose restriction on α, which can then be
greater than one ). We restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, hence ai(t) =
a(t) and τ(t, i, α) = τ(t). Since the intervention is balanced budget, it must
be G(t) = T(t). This implies τ˜(t, α) = −αG(t)/b(t) and ∫i τ(t, i, α)di = (1−
α)G(t).
Denote the time of effective intervention with TP.8 The value function of an
investor who holds a(t) units of bonds and carry them until maturity is equal
8As it will become clear in this section the time of intervention when the market reacts to
the policy announcement, the authority will intervene at a time TP is in general different than
the default time without intervention, T.
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to:
V (a(t)) =
∫ TE
t
[−a(s)τ˜(s, α)− τ(s, α) + (ρ+ δ+ λ)a(s)]e−(ρ+δ+λ)(s−t)ds
+V(a(TE)|q(TE))e−(ρ+δ+λ)(TE−t).
In equilibrium investors must be indifferent between holding a bond until ma-
turity or selling a bond on the secondary market, then it must be q(t|α) =
V′(a(t)), where we use the notation q(t|α) to indicate the bond price when an
intervention financed with a fiscal policy α is in place. The bond price reads
q(t|α) =
∫ TE
t
[−τ˜(s, α) + (ρ+ δ+ λ)]e−(ρ+δ+λ)(s−t)ds + q(TE)e−(ρ+δ+λ)(TE−t).
(1.33)
where q(TE) = φλr+λ . Three remarks are worth making. First, the bond price
depends upon the time TP in which the intervention starts. This is because
investors know that the government will finance its policy levying taxes start-
ing from TP. However, TP is an equilibrium object which is a function of α
and the initial level of debt b(0). Second, investors internalize the interven-
tion and they understand that the interest repayment will continue until the
time in which the intervention stops, TE. Therefore, ex-ante the bond value
appreciates, because the policy will delay default. Third, notice that the value
of a bond depends on the extent to which taxation is affected by individual
portfolio decisions. The term
∫ TE
t τ˜(s, α)e
−(ρ+δ+λ)(TE−t)ds captures this effect.
Specifically, taxation affects the value of bond only on the way the individ-
ual tax varies with individual bond holdings, a(t). The dependence of the tax
on t captures the fact that the total amount of tax revenue required to finance
the intervention varies with time, since the total revenue needs to equate the
planner loss, as described in equation (1.23).
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Ex-Ante Symmetric Rational Expectation Equilibrium. We are now ready
to define the ex-ante symmetric equilibrium of our economy when the inter-
vention is anticipated and prior to the jump to the high income state.
Definition 4. An Ex-Ante Symmetric Rational Expectation Equilibrium is: a
time of policy intervention TP, a time of end of policy TE, a market bond price
{q (t| α)}TEt=0, a policy bond price {qP(t)}T
E
t=TP , a tax rule α, a gross subsidy
{G(t)}TEt=TP a saving policy {b(t)}T
E
t=0, such that
(i) Given α, and associated gross subsidy {G(t)}TEt=TP the bond market price
satisfies (1.33) from t ∈ [0, TE].
(i) the government solves problem (1.14) taking as given the market bond
price {q (t| α)}TEt=0 for t < t ≤ TP, and the policy bond price {qP(t)}T
E
TP for
TP ≤ t < TE.
(i) the monetary/fiscal authority:
• intervenes at TP if TP < T j and solves its problem in (1.26)-(1.28);
• stops the intervention at TE if TE < T j;
• follows the policy rule in (1.32) and balance its budget as in (1.23)
(i) bond markets clear.
It is important to understand that with the policy in place, the government
does not choose anymore the optimal time of default T, but it chooses the op-
timal time of intervention TP. However, since the intervention makes the gov-
ernment indifferent between default and repayment, it does not affect the scrap
value in problem 1.14, and the government problem remains identical as be-
fore, with the difference that the bond market price at intervention q(TP|α) is a
function of the policy rule α and it will be endogenous to the gain in time from
the intervention. The following result characterizes the optimal intervention
and allow us to pin down he equilibrium.
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Proposition 6. Characterization of Ex-Ante Equilibrium. In the ex-ante symmetric
rational expectation equilibrium described above, at the time of intervention TP, it
must be :
q
(
TP|α
)
= qP(TP).
See Appendix A.6 for the proof.
1.7 Welfare
As the equation (1.33) displays, the ex-ante effects on the equilibrium bond
price depend on how the individual taxation is linked to the amount of indi-
vidual asset holdings. Hence, the ex-ante welfare implications of the policy
are tightly related to the fiscal rule, α, implemented to finance the interven-
tion. In this section, first we illustrate the ex-ante equilibrium in the case the
policy is fully financed with a non-distortionary lump-sum tax (α = 0). Then
we generalize our findings for a generic α. .
1.7.1 Non-distortionary Taxation
Let first assume that the monetary/fiscal authority finances the policy inter-
vention entirely with a lump-sum tax. This is equivalent to set α = 0. This tax
is not distortionary. In fact, as equation (1.33) shows, the lump-sum tax does
not affect an investor’s bond evaluation when the policy is announced. How-
ever, the fact that the cost of the policy is not internalized by the bond price
generates an over-valuation of the bond which results in an ex-ante loss for
investors. When the policy is accounted for, the investor prices the bond con-
sidering that the policy generates a delay of default. The bond then becomes
more appealing and its value appreciates. Nevertheless, investors will have to
bear the entire cost of the policy. Figure 1.4 displays the dynamics of the main
economic variables. The top-left panel represents the bond price. The dot rep-
resents the value of the bond in a model without intervention. The solid line
Chapter 1. Non-exclusivity externality in Sovereign bond markets 40
represents the ex-ante bond prices that account for the existence of the pol-
icy. The policy, then, improves the credit conditions faced by the peripheral
country, which can now borrow at a lower interest rate. As a consequence,
ex-ante the government can increase its consumption level by borrowing at a
higher pace, as displayed in the top-right plot. If the recession is long lasting,
eventually the bond price devaluates until, at time TP, the policy will be im-
plemented. Notice that the policy announcement per-se delays the policy im-
plementation of a quite large time since, absent market reaction as displayed
in Figure 1.3, the authority would have intervened at time T. Hence, the in-
tervention following the announcement occurs at a quite large debt-to-income
level, and, by Proposition 5 the ex-post net gain from the intervention is lower,
as measured by the low value of the ICC at the moment of intervention. Also,
from the bottom-left figures it is clear that the existence of the policy makes
a higher level of debt more sustainable, since the endogenous debt limit is
b(TP) < b(T).
1.7.2 Distortionary taxation and Pareto Improving Policies
The example with the policy financed with a lump-sum tax helps to under-
stand an important feature of the ex-ante welfare effects of the policy: the bond
price appreciation that stems from the fact that taxes are not internalized in the
bond price, acts as an implicit fiscal transfer from investors to the peripheral
country; the higher the bond price appreciation, the higher is the magnitude
of that transfer. In this subsection we formalize this concept, allowing for the
possibility that taxation is distortionary (α > 0).
In order to properly address the welfare effect of the policy, suppose that
the policy is announced at time 0, and that the government has a correspond-
ing outstanding initial level of debt b(0) ≤ 0. We define the ex-ante welfare
gain of a representative investor that holds all the initial stock of debt b(0)
and underwrites every new bond issuance as ∆V(α, b(0)). Similarly, we de-
fine with ∆W(α, b(0)) the ex-ante welfare gain of the borrowing government.
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FIGURE 1.4: Bond Price and Debt before Default
Note: this graph plots the ex-ante competitive equilibrium path of the bond price (top-left panel), level
of asset as a fraction of output (bottom-left panel), peripheral economy’s consumption (top-right panel)
and ICC function (bottom-right panel) as a function of time (x-axis). The dots represent the value of the
variables absent policy.
The notation makes explicit that the two measures of welfare are a function of
the relevant fiscal rule α and of the initial stock of debt at announcement b(0).
The first step of our analysis is to characterize the link between the fiscal rule
α and these welfare measures. The gain from the policy for the representative
investor is the sum of two components:
∆V(α, b(0)) = −b(0)
∫ TE
T
(r + λ(1− φ))e−δTe−(r+λ)(s−t)ds+
− (1− α)
∫ TE
TP
G(s)e−(r+λ)(T
E−t)ds. (1.34)
The first term is the gain from the delay in default brought about by the policy
but not internalized before the announcement. To the extent that TE > T, this
term is positive. The second term is the cost brought about by financing part of
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the intervention with lump-sum tax. This term is negative as long as α < 1. If
we restrict attention to b(0) = 0, which correspond to the case where investors
knew about the policy since the onset and α ≥ 1, we are able to provide the
following characterization:
Proposition 7. Let q(TP) be the bond price at intervention, b(TP) be debt at inter-
vention, ∆W(α, 0) the welfare gain of the borrowing country and ∆V(α, 0) the welfare
gain of the representative investor, then for α ≥ 1
• q(TP) and W(α, 0) are monotonically decreasing in α,
• b(TP) and V(α, 0) are monotonically increasing in α.
See Appendix A.7 for the proof.
Proposition 7 states a very important result. The monetary/fiscal author-
ity can use the fiscal policy α as redistribution instrument between investors’
welfare and the peripheral country’s welfare. Financing the intervention by
imposing heavy taxes to bond holding depresses bond prices and the coun-
try’s welfare in favour of investors’ welfare. On the contrary, by attenuating
the dependence of the tax upon bond holding, the policymaker creates an over
valuation of the bond price which diminishes investors’ welfare in favour of
the country’s welfare by creating an implicit fiscal transfer to the latter. This
proposition indeed shows that α is actually a measure of the implicit transfer
from investors to the country.
The second step is to characterize the set of Pareto improving interventions.
At the limiting case in which the fiscal rule aggressively taxes bond holding
(α = α¯ > 1) so that q(TP) = q(T), the welfare gain of the peripheral country
must be equal to zero. In this case the existence of the policy does not affect
the market price before intervention and therefore, its effects are equivalent
to the effects of an ex-post policy that takes place at T. Investors will get the
entire benefit from the intervention as the amount of the tax revenue collected
through the proportional tax in excess of the financing cost, that is (α¯− 1)G(t),
is redistributed lump-sum to the investors. On the opposite extreme of the
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Pareto set, in which α = 1, by (1.34), it must be ∆(α, 0) = 0, and all the benefit
from the intervention will go to the peripheral country.
In addition, when α decreases, then, by Proposition 7 investors’ gain from
intervention decreases and the country’s gain increases. That means that all
the policy characterized by α such that the investor’s gain is still positive are
Pareto improving. The following Proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 8. Pareto set. For b(0) = 0, there exists a non empty set α ∈ [1, α¯]
of Pareto Improving policies. In particular, ∆W(1, 0) > 0 and ∆V(1, 0) = 0, while
∆W(α¯, 0) = 0 and ∆V(α¯, 0) > 0.
See Appendix 8 for the proof.
In Figure 1.5 we display the equilibrium paths of the policy that are at the
boundary of the Pareto improving set. We show two cases. The first case is
characterized by a fiscal policy that taxes aggressively bond holding. In this
scenario α > 1 and ∆W(α) is equal to zero, as displayed by the dotted line.
As stated in Proposition 8, this scenario is characterized a positive gain for in-
vestors and by the smallest, and equal to zero, gain for the peripheral country.
The time of intervention in this case is indicated with TP−i and the intervention
region is represented with a light shaded area. The second case is characterized
by a fiscal policy that taxes less aggressively bond holdings. In this scenario
α = 1 and the bond market price is higher than the one absent policy, i.e. ∆q(b)
is positive, and equal to ∆¯q(b), as displayed by the dashed line. This scenario
is characterized by the largest gain from the policy for the peripheral country
and by a gain for investors equal to zero. The time of intervention in this case
is indicated with TP−c and the intervention region is represented with a dark
shaded area. The jump in the bond price delays the time of intervention, to
TP−c and, increases the country’s consumption, and diminishes the ex-post in-
centive to intervene for investors, as indicated by the ICC panel. Importantly,
any fiscal policy that implies a size of the jump between the two cases dis-
played in the figure represent a Pareto improving policy. Also, the largest is
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the size of that jump the largest is the redistribution of welfare from investors
to the peripheral country. Indeed, the jumps map one-to-one movements in α.
FIGURE 1.5: distortionary taxation and Pareto Improving Policies
Note: this graph plots the competitive equilibrium path of the bond price (top-left panel), level of asset
as a fraction of output (bottom-left panel), peripheral economy’s consumption (top-right panel), and ICC
function (bottom-right panel) as a function of time (x-axis).
Finally, in Table 1.1 we present some summary statistics about the equi-
librium dynamics of our model under three different fiscal policies. In the
first column we study an economy such that that the implied price apprecia-
tion due to accounting for the existence of the policy is zero, so that that fiscal
rule implies a Pareto improving policy that is optimal for investors. This case
should be interpreted as a policy that aggressively taxes bond holdings. In the
second column we study an economy such that that the ex-ante implied price
appreciation is ∆¯q(b(0)), so that that fiscal rule implies a Pareto improving pol-
icy that is optimal for the peripheral country. This case should be interpreted
as a policy that mildly taxes bond holdings. In the third column we study an
economy in which the authority imposes a lump-sum tax to finance the policy,
and, therefore, the policy does not tax at all bond holdings. The calibration of
the parameters of the model is as follow. The recession implies at income yL
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that is 85% lower than in the good state, yH. The maturity of the bond is δ=0.5.
The debt repayment after default, φ is set to be equal to 0.95. The interest rate r
and the discount rate ρ are equal to 0.02. Finally, the economy starts at period
t0 with zero debt.
TABLE 1.1: Statistics of three different fiscal policies
Pareto Improving Non Pareto Improving
Optimal for Investors Optimal for Country Lump-Sum Tax
Asset Price and Debt
Spread without policy at b(0) 19.29 19.29 19.29
Spread with policy at b(0) 19.29 6.96 2.30
∆ Spread 0 -12.33 -16.99
Debt/GDP at Intervention 13.21 29.75 60.12
Probabilities at Announcement
Prob. of Intervention 95 87 77
Prob. of Default 69 63 64
Welfare Gain/Loss from Policy
Welfare Investors (Cons. Equiv) 0.64 0 -1.40
Welfare Country (Cons. Equiv) 0 0.66 0.70
In our economy at the initial time the spread, measured as the annualized
differerence between the return on the sovereign bond and the risk free rate,
is about 19 percent. The second and third row displays the effect of the pol-
icy on the sovereign bond interest rate at that debt level. By construction, the
case in which the policy is optimal for investor is designed such that there is
no appreciation on the value of the bond. Hence, the annualized spread in
the ex-ante equilibrium remains 19 percent. In the second scenario, the au-
thority taxes lightly bond holding and the spread becomes 7 percent. This
change reflects a bond price jump equal to ∆¯q(b(0)). Finally, if the author-
ity finances the policy via lump-sum taxes, the spread decline drastically to
2.3 percent. Hence, the existence of the policy creates a large bond evaluation
just because investors have incentive to demand sovereign bonds. The differ-
ent fiscal policy and the associated changes in the bond prices imply different
moments in which the intervention will take place: the lower the bond price
jump, the earlier the authority will intervene. Since, if the recession is long
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lasting, the peripheral county’s debt increases with time, it follows that differ-
ent fiscal policies also imply different degree of debt sustainability before the
intervention. As the forth row shows, if the policy does not affect bond prices,
the authority will intervene early, that is at low level of debt-to-GDP ratios (13
percent). If the fiscal policy is financed with lump-sum taxes, the large increase
in market valuation of the bond implies that the market will be able to support
much large sovereign debt, up to 60 percent in terms of GDP. As the second
panel shows, we can compute the probability of intervention, and of default,
in each scenario. Recall, that if the exogenous process for income jumps to the
higher state, default will never occur and therefore there is no need of inter-
vention. We can then compute how different policies affects the probability
of intervention and default. We can notice that if the announcement does not
alter the bond price intervention is very likely (95 percent). When the fiscal
policy induces bond appreciation, the market, as already explained, can sus-
tain the sovereign borrowing for longer. The probability for intervention falls
to 87 and 77 percent for the other two scenarios. Intuitively, by taxing bond
holding non aggressively, the authority can induces bond appreciation and
can buy time, hoping that a good realization of income realizes before an in-
tervention is needed. Nevertheless, notice that the default probability do not
change drastically across the three scenarios. This is because an intervention
that starts at larger level of debt is shorter, since investors’ gain are reduced.
The third panel shows the ex-ante welfare gain/loss from the intervention, in
terms of consumption equivalent. In the first scenario, the country does not
benefit from the policy. This is intuitive because the policy is designed to make
the peripheral country as well off as its default value. Since in the first scenario
the existence of the policy does not alter the market outcome, then the periph-
eral must not benefit from the policy. On the contrary, investors are better off,
as much as 0.64 percent in consumption equivalent, because the intervention
is able to address the non-exclusivity externality. It can be inferred that for our
calibration this externality is quite costly in terms of welfare. This scenario is at
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one extreme of the spectrum of Pareto improving policies, since the peripheral
country is unaffected by the policy intervention. The second scenario also de-
livers not surprisingly results. In fact, in that case the fiscal policy is designed
to create bond price jump equal to ∆¯q(b), which, by Proposition 8, is defined to
generate investors’ gain equal to zero. In this case, the authority mildly taxes
bond holding, the bond price at announcement slightly jumps, and therefore
the market outcome is affected. The bond appreciation allows the peripheral
country to borrow at better condition even before the intervention. Hence, it
can enjoy higher consumption and its welfare increases. This is the other ex-
treme of the spectrum of Pareto improving policies, in which now investors are
unaffected by the policy: the gain obtained by eliminating the non-exclusivity
externality are completely transferred to the peripheral country. Finally, the last
column shows that a lump-sum taxation induces a so large bond appreciation
that investors are worse off from the intervention. This is because the policy
creates ex-ante incentives to demand bonds that, in turns, make the policy non
beneficial from the investors’ point of view.
1.8 Conclusions
This paper highlights the presence of a novel externality in sovereign bond
markets, that we label as non-exclusivity externality. This externality arises be-
cause in a competitive market, in which the ownership of debt is anonymous
and dispersed, the equilibrium price of new debt on the primary market might
be too low to avoid default, even though preventing default would be in the
interest of existing creditors. We then show that a policy that subsidizes the
underwriting of new bond issuance by taxing existing bondholders, is ex-post
Pareto improving. This is true because, upon default, the benefit from delaying
default is always greater than the cost, even though the duration of the policy
is limited in time. However, the benefit ex-ante depends crucially on the ability
of the policy-maker to tax bond-holdings in such a way that the price ex-ante
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will reflect the cost of the policy. Absent this possibility, the policy is ex-ante
detrimental.
49
Chapter 2
Credit Failures and Interventions
When asymmetric information in credit markets constrains investment, the
quality of public information about firms is vital to sustain investment and
economic growth. The aftermath of the 2008 crisis reminded it to us, as rating
agencies downgraded around 90% of the structured products they had classi-
fied as investment grade prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy, casting doubts about
the usefulness of ratings to predict creditworthiness. In this paper, we show
that when adverse selection is severe: (i) public information affects the invest-
ment rate of the economy; (ii) competitive equilibria are constrained inefficient,
so regulator interventions can improve on market outcomes, even though they
face the same set of constraints; (iii) purely informational shocks – that is, shocks
to the degree of public information that do not affect other fundamentals of the
economy – can generate sharp and persistent contractions in investment and
production, that can help explain the prolonged capital and labor unemploy-
ment after a crisis.
To make these arguments, we consider an infinite horizon, two-goods ver-
sion of Philippon and Skreta (2012), with a long-lived household and overlap-
ping generations of firms. At each date, credit markets are segmented: a set of
heterogeneous firms is able to invest under full information (they are transpar-
ent). The others are subject to a lemon problem à la Akerlof (1970), and so are
opaque. To clarify the effect of purely informational shocks, we let the propor-
tion of each type of firm in the two subsets be the same, so that shifting mass
from one subset to the other does not have any impact on fundamentals other
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than information. Credit is offered by the representative household, via an un-
modeled competitive banking sector, and it affects the chances that the firm
will be productive in the subsequent period. Conditional on being productive,
all firms are identical: they employ capital to produce the only other good in
the economy (consumption) under decreasing returns to scale.1
We first characterize the steady states of a non-stochastic version of this
economy, where firms profits flow back to the household sector. When adverse
selection is not severe, competitive allocations are efficient and the economy is
at full investment. Public information has no effect on growth rates. An in-
crease in the degree of informational asymmetries brings about equilibria with
less than full investment, and there exists a threshold in the severity of the ad-
verse selection problem below which all competitive equilibria are constrained
inefficient. We prove this constructively, showing that a balanced-budget pol-
icy that subsidizes investment and taxes consumption in steady state imple-
ments a competitive equilibrium with full investment. In this case, the quality
of public information affects the pool of investing firms. In particular: (i) it
is positively correlated with aggregate investment and growth; (ii) it does not
affect credit spreads because the pool of firms subject to adverse selection is
unaffected. The latter is a feature of steady states which will disappear once
we consider informational shocks.
Then, we extend the analysis to the case where firms consume their own
profits. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for local constrained
suboptimality, which roughly states that there exists a local Pareto improving
intervention if and only if the percentage increase in the mispricing of the se-
curities issued by the marginal type between the laissez faire equilibrium and
the aftermath of the intervention is weakly lower than the household’s gain
from a marginally higher investment rate.
Finally, we consider the effects on the economy of a one-time unanticipated
1Decreasing returns to scale guarantees that productive firms make strictly positive profits,
which can cover the sunk investment cost eventually incurred.
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informational shock to the quality of public information. The exercise is moti-
vated by the rating crisis of late 2008, but we believe that more general lessons
can be learned by it. A sudden drop in the quality of public information gener-
ates several effects that are consistent with the data. First, after a short-lived in-
crease, the capital stock plummets and so does the aggregate volume of credit
to the economy. Both drops are quite persistent, for instance a 20% drop in the
quality of public information may lead to a capital stock that is 15% lower than
the steady state level after 60 quarters.
Credit market dynamics are of particular interest. They are characterized
by two phases. In the first phase, shortly after the shock, credit to opaque firms
expands, and interest rates fall. This is due to the lower overall credit granted
(driven by the drop in demand by high quality firms, a larger proportion of
which is now opaque), which increase the expected value of investment by
opaque firms and so increases the threshold for investing firms within this
pool. In the second phase, as the public information channels are gradually
restored, credit to opaque firms fall and interest rates recover.
Overall, we believe that studying the role of public information in economies
where credit is subject to asymmetric information is not only realistic, but also
important to generate predictions consistent with the facts and to justify reg-
ulatory interventions. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for in-
terventions to be beneficial, and we implement efficient allocations by means
of investment subsidies, consumption taxes and decentralized markets. We
show that purely informational shocks do justify interventions, and generate
prolonged periods of low investment and low growth, despite the absence of
any productivity shock.
The paper has the following structure: Section 2.1 presents the model econ-
omy and its properties; Section 2.2 characterizes the set of competitive equilib-
ria and their efficiency properties under full information first and then under
asymmetric information; Section 2.3 studies the constrained efficiency proper-
ties of the equilibria, 2.4 studies the effect of a pure informational crisis; Section
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2.5 concludes.
2.1 The Model Economy
In this section we discuss our benchmark model economy. Time is discrete and
lasts forever, t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞. The economy is populated by a unit measure of
identical households and overlapping generations of entrepreneurs. House-
holds are infinitely lived, while entrepreneurs live for two periods. Each pe-
riod a new generation of entrepreneurs of measure one is born, so that two
generations of entrepreneurs are alive at each point in time. There is a sin-
gle final good that can be either consumed or transformed in capital using a
one-to-one technology.
2.1.1 Households
The representative household has lifetime utility function
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtu(Ct) (2.1)
where u(◦) is an increasing and strictly concave utility function that satisfies
the Inada conditions and β ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of time preference. The house-
hold faces the following budget constraint:
Ct + Bt + It ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 + PtKt−1 + χΠt. (2.2)
Each period, the household rents his initial capital holdings Kt−1 at a unit price
Pt, receives gross interests Rt−1Bt−1 from bond holdings, and profits χΠt, from
holding a fraction χ ∈ [0, 1] of shares in the productive sector. The household
uses the proceedings to consume Ct and invest either in capital production
It or in a fully diversified portfolio of loans to the entrepreneurs Bt. Capital
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depreciates at a rate δ, and the law of motion for capital yields
It = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1. (2.3)
Every period households, taking prices Rt, Pt as given, choose Ct, Kt, Bt to
maximize (1) subject to (2), (3) and the transversality conditions:
lim
T→∞
βTu′(cT)BT = 0,
lim
T→∞
βTu′(cT)KT = 0.
Optimization yields the Euler equation:
Et
[
βu′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
]
=
1
Rt
. (2.4)
together with the no-arbitrage condition
Et
[(
βu′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
)
(1+ Pt+1 − δ)
]
= 1. (2.5)
2.1.2 Entrepreneurs
The technology to produce the final good is run by overlapping generation
of risk neutral entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs live for two periods, but they
can be productive only in the second period of their lives. Each generation
consists of a continuum of agents with aggregate mass equal to one, who are
born with heterogeneous types θ ∈ [0, 1], drawn according to the distribution
function F(θ). A type-θ entrepreneur who is born at date t will be productive at
t+ 1 with probability p(θ) ∈ [0, 1]. If productive, she runs a type-independent
decreasing return to scale technology that uses capital as input:
yt = kα.
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We order the type space so that p(θ) > p(θ′) ⇐⇒ θ > θ′. Crucially, young
entrepreneurs at date t can invest in order to increase the probability of being
productive at t + 1 up to p¯(θ) > p(θ). We follow Philippon and Skreta (2012)
and make the following assumption
Assumption 1. Gains from investment are type-independent: p¯(θ)− p(θ) = ζ.
Investment requires a fixed input of x units of date t consumption good.
Entrepreneurs are born with no endowment and need to finance investment
by borrowing from the household. In the second period of their lives they are
matched with a random household to whom they give a fraction χ ∈ [0, 1]
of the profits and consume the rest. They get utility only from consuming in
the second period of their lives and from the utility of the households they
are matched with. The problem of a type-θ entrepreneur conditional on the
information set = can be cast as
Πt(θ|=) = max
kt,1t
(
p(θ) + 1tζ
) [
kαt − Et[Pt+1]kt − 1tRLt (θ|=)x
]
(2.6)
where 1t is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if investment is under-
taken and 0 otherwise, while RLt (θ|=) is the lending rate on the credit market
conditional on the information available. Entrepreneurs maximize (2.6) taking
prices Et[Pt+1] and RLt (θ|=) as given. Optimality requires
Et[Pt+1] = αkα−1t , (2.7)
1t(θ|=) =

1 if ζ [(1− α)kαt ] > RLt (θ|=) p¯(θ)x
{0, 1} if ζ [(1− α)kαt ] = RLt (θ|=) p¯(θ)x
0 if ζ [(1− α)kαt ] < RLt (θ|=) p¯(θ)x
(2.8)
Notice that, despite each household faces idiosyncratic uncertainty since
it might be matched with an unproductive entrepreneur, there is no uncer-
tainty about aggregate productivity in the economy. This implies that in the
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formulation of the profit function (2.6), entrepreneurs does not need to con-
sider the household discount factor. Indeed, since markets are complete, each
household is able to fully diversify its idiosyncratic risk. It follows that each
household will get an equal share of aggregate profits.
2.1.3 Information structure
Entrepreneurs know their types; however, their types are private information.
They are publicly observable only with probability λ. Define the information
set = as
= ≡
1 if type is publicly observable0 otherwise,
then λ is the probability that= = 1. It follows that by the law of large numbers,
a fraction λ of each θ-type entrepreneur is ‘transparent’ and a fraction 1− λ is
‘opaque’. Credit markets are segmented: absent costless and credible signal-
ing opportunities, the investment decision of ‘opaque’ entrepreneurs will be
affected by asymmetries of information, while the ‘transparent’ entrepreneurs
will invest under full information.
In the first part of the paper we characterize the steady state of the econ-
omy and perform comparative statics under the assumption that λ is constant
and time invariant. In the second part, we use the variable λ to introduce in-
formational shock, that is shocks which alter the degree of information but not
the fundamentals of the economy. We assume that λ follows an AR(1) process
of the form
λt =
eξt
1+ eξt
ξt = (1− ρ)µ+ ρξt−1 + et (2.9)
for ρ ∈ [0, 1), µ ≥ 0 and et ∼ N(0, σ2e ).
Shocks to λ are the sole driver of fluctuations in our model. Summing up, our
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economy has five endogenous quantities at each date t: household’s consump-
tion Ct, household’s investment in capital It; household’s deposits Bt, firm’s
investment policy 1t(θ|=). The endogenous prices at date t are: the price of
capital Pt, the lending rate RLt (θ|=) and the deposit rate Rt. Notice that the
lending rate can vary depending on entrepreneurial types θ ∈ Θ in equilib-
rium only if either (i) types are publicly observable (i.e. = = 1), or (ii) they can
be credibly signalled. After defining the notion of competitive equilibrium, we
consider the full information case first, to provide a benchmark, and then we
will introduce adverse selection.
2.2 Competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium of the model economy is described as follows.
Definition 5. A competitive equilibrium consists in prices {Rt, RLt (θ|=), Pt}∞t=0 and
allocations {Ct, Kt−1, kt−1, Bt}∞t=0 such that:
• Households maximize their utility given prices {Rt, Pt}∞t=0
• Entrepreneurs maximize profits given prices {Rt, Pt, RLt (θ|=)}∞t=0
• Prices clear the markets:
Kt =
(∫ 1
0
(p(θ) + 1t(θ)ζ) f (θ)dθ
)
kt
Ct + It + Bt =
(∫ 1
0
(p(θ) + 1t−1(θ)ζ) f (θ)dθ
)1−α
Kαt−1
Bt = x
[
λ
∫ 1
0
1t(θ|1) f (θ)dθ + (1− λ)
∫ 1
0
1t(θ|0) f (θ)dθ
]
2.2.1 Full information
We first restrict attention to the competitive equilibrium of the economy un-
der full information. This corresponds to the case where the types of every
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entrepreneur are public observable with probability λ = 1. Under full infor-
mation, absence of arbitrage opportunities on the credit market requires that
every entrepreneur of type θ is charged the lending rate
RLt−1(θ|1) =
Rt−1
p¯(θt)
, (2.10)
which takes into consideration that, by the law of large numbers, idiosyncratic
risk can be fully diversified and only a fraction p¯(θ) of the loans will be paid
back. Substituting (2.10) in (2.8), it follows that the decision to invest under
full information is type-independent and given by
1t =

1 if Rtx < ζ(1− α)kαt
{0, 1} if Rtx = ζ(1− α)kαt
0 if Rtx > ζ(1− α)kαt ,
(2.11)
The condition above tells us that investment is undertaken if it features net
positive present value, that is, if the discounted additional revenue from in-
vestment ζ(1− α)kαt /Rt is greater than the cost x. However, notice that for a
given level of aggregate capital Kt, kt is endogenous to the investment decision
1t. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Proposition 9. If λ = 1, the competitive equilibrium is characterized by equations
(2.2),(2.3),(2.4), (2.5),(2.6),(2.7),(2.8),(2.11). These 8 equations, fully determine the
dynamics of prices Rt, RLt (θ), Pt and quantities Ct, It, Kt, Bt,1t
Steady state characterization
Equations (2.4),(2.5),(2.7) together imply that at the steady state R = 1/β, and
k =
[
αβ
1−β(1−δ)
] 1
1−α . Since we are interested in deviation from full investment,
and we want to restrict attention to pure strategies, we make the following
assumption that we maintain for the rest of the paper:
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Assumption 2. Investment has net positive present value at the steady state:
x < βζ(1− α)
[
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
] α
1−α
Proposition 10. Under assumption (2) the steady state is unique and features full
investment. At the steady state the economy achieves the first best.
Proof. The first statement follows immediately from equation (2.11). Pareto op-
timality follows from realizing that the investment condition (2.11), is the same
of an unconstrained social planner that maximizes household utility subject to
the aggregate resource constraint.
2.2.2 Adverse selection
We now extend our benchmark economy to consider adverse selection. To this
end, we assume λ < 1, and we restrict attention to the case where a positive
fraction of entrepreneurs are affected by asymmetries of information in the
credit market. Let focus on the ‘opaque’ entrepreneurs, since we dealt with
credit markets under full information in the previous section.
Lemma 4. When entrepreneurial types are private information, two properties of in-
terest rates must hold: i) there can only be a pooling rate of interest. RLt (θ|0) = RLt ,
∀θ ∈ [0, 1]. ii) Whenever type θ′ invests, so do all θ ∈ [0, θ′).
Proof. 1. First, there can only be a pooling rate of interest. To see why, con-
sider the profit function (2.6) conditional on investment - i.e., with 1 = 1.
Revenues are equal to ζ(1− α)kα, independently from the entrepreneur’s
type θ. Costs are p¯(θ)(1+ RLt−1)x, and they increase with R
L
t−1. So, if two
or more rates are quoted, everyone would choose the lower rate: screen-
ing of types is impossible.2
2Technically, the loan rate r might still depend on θ if entrepreneurs resort to random con-
tracts, i.e. contracts that consist in both a loan rate, and a probability with which the loan is
granted strictly between zero and one for all θ ∈ Θ \ {θ}. We do not consider such contracts
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2. Second, since (i) RLt is independent from θ, and (ii) costs increase in p¯(θ),
it follows that whenever type θ′ invests, so do all θ ∈ [0, θ′).
As a result, the set of investing types is fully characterized by a threshold θˆ,
where
θˆt ≡ sup{θ ∈ [0, 1] | Πt(θ|= = 0,1t = 1) ≥ Πt(θ|= = 0,1t = 0)}. (2.12)
By the law of large numbers, the fraction of productive firms who invest sub-
ject to informational asymmetries is exactly equal to F(θˆ). The pooling lending
rate solves:
RLt =
Rt
E[ p¯(θ)|θ ≤ θˆt]
(2.13)
where E[ p¯(θ)|θ ≤ θˆt] ≡
∫ θˆ
0 p¯(s)
f (s)
F(θˆ)
ds. By the definition of θˆ in (2.12), the
threshold θˆt can be derived from the indifference condition of the entrepreneurs
as [
p¯(θˆt)
E[ p¯(θ)|θ ≤ θˆt]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information premium
Rt−1x = ζ(1− α)kαt (2.14)
Proposition 11. The competitive equilibrium is characterized by equations (2.2),(2.3),(2.4),
(2.5),(2.6),(2.7),(2.8),(2.11), (2.14). These 9 equations, fully determine the dynamics
of prices Rt, RLt (θ), Pt, the pooling rate R
L
t , quantities Ct, It, Kt, Bt,1t and threshold
θˆt
because: (i) our qualitative results do not change if we allow for such contracts. In particu-
lar, random contracts never implement full investment because all types higher than θ have
to choose a probability of investment strictly less than one; (ii) we would need to introduce
incentive compatibility constraints in the definition of a competitive equilibrium, which is
not straightforward; (iii) random contracts of this type are not observed empirically, perhaps
because they are not renegotiation proof: after the contract is signed, a Pareto improvement
could be achieved by increasing the probability of investment to one.
Chapter 2. Credit Failures and Interventions 60
By comparing (2.14) with the investment condition under full information,
it emerges that adverse selection brings about an Information premium. It is a
measure of the degree of cross-subsidization from the marginal type, whose
productivity is the highest among the investing entrepreneurs, to the average
investing type. Importantly, the Information premium need not be monotoni-
cally increasing in θˆ. This gives rise to the possibility of multiple steady states.
In the following section, we characterize the steady states and we provide con-
ditions for such multiplicity to arise.
Steady state characterization
Let’s define a function H(θ), which describes the information premium as a
function of the threshold θ:
H(θ) ≡ p¯(θ)
E [ p¯(s)|s ≤ θ] , (2.15)
and define θ¯ ≡ arg maxθ∈[0,1] H(θ), θ ≡ arg minθ∈[0,1] H(θ), pi(k) ≡ (1−
α)kα, where k is the steady state level of capital which coincides with the steady
state under full information. We know that θ¯ and θ are well defined since
H(θ) is a continuous functions and Θ is compact. The following proposition
characterizes the steady states of this economy.
Proposition 12. A steady state exists and:
1. If βζpi(k)x > H(θ¯), at the unique steady state every type invests (θˆ = 1);
2. If βζpi(k)x ∈ [H(θ), H(θ¯)], we have two cases:
(a) If βζpi(k)x < H(1), every steady state features underinvestment (θˆ < 1);
(b) If βζpi(k)x ≥ H(1), there exist (generically) at least three steady states, one
of which with full investment.
3. If βζpi(k)x < H(θ), there exists a unique steady state with no investment.
Proof. Case (1): Existence: an equilibrium with θˆ = 1 exists because βζpi(k)x >
H(1). Uniqueness follows from βζpi(k)x > H(θˆ), for every θˆ ∈ [0, 1]. Case
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(2.a): It is obvious that we cannot have an equilibrium with θˆ = 1 because
βζpi(k)
x < H(1). It remains to show that an equilibrium with θˆ < 1 exists.
We know that H(θ) ≤ βζpi(k)x < H(θ¯). With regards to the function H(θˆ),
observe that: (i) it is continuous in θˆ, and (ii) a steady state is characterized
by a threshold θˆ such that H(θˆ) = βζpi(k)x . Existence of a steady state follows
from the intermediate value theorem. Figure 2.1, Panel (a) shows an example
of such case, where there exist three interior steady states (θˆ1,θˆ2,θˆ3). Case (2.b):
Because βζpi(k)x ≥ H(1), we know that the steady state with full investment
always exists. Moreover, if θ¯ 6= 1 there will be at least another steady state
with less than full investment. Generically, there will be an even number of
steady states with less than full investment (so, there is an odd number of
steady states in total). Figure 2.1, Panel (b) shows an example of such case,
where there exist three steady states (θˆ1,θˆ2,1). Case (3): We have H(θ) ≥ 1,
FIGURE 2.1: The steady states in Proposition (12), Case 2
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Case (b)
because H(0) = 1. Since under full information the cost of investment for type
θ is equal to one, the result follows.
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Comparative statics
Before moving to the dynamic characterization of our economy in section (2.4),
it is helpful to perform some comparative statics. We are interested in two
dimensions: the fraction of transparent entrepreneurs λ and the distribution of
types F(θ). The latter is a measure of the degree of information asymmetries
in the economy, the former, conditional on a given function p(θ), is a measure
of the production possibilities.
Information asymmetries The fraction of ’transparent’ entrepreneurs λ mea-
sures the level of asymmetric information, with λ = 1 being the full infor-
mation case. However, since the distribution of types inside each of the two
groups is independent of λ, it does not directly affect the information pre-
mium, hence the degree of adverse selection inside the pool of opaque en-
trepreneurs. It follows that at the steady state, θˆ is independent of λ. Under
assumption (2), it is straightforward to see that output is linear in λ:
Y =
(
ζ[λ+ (1− λ)F(θˆ)] +
∫ 1
0
p(θ) f (θ)dθ
)
kα,
with derivative
∂Y
∂λ
= ζ(1− F(θˆ))kα. (2.16)
The term ζ(1− F(θˆ)) has to be interpreted as the productivity gain from shift-
ing a mass of agents from the opaque to the transparent pool. An important
feature of equation (2.16) is that the impact of a shift in λ on Y is stronger the
lower the θˆ, that is, the higher the degree of underlying adverse selection in
the economy as is it shown in Figure 2.
It is worth anticipating that θˆ will generally be a function of λ when we
consider a stochastic version of this economy, in the subsequent sections.
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FIGURE 2.2: Comparative statics: ss. Y as a function of λ, condi-
tional on different θˆ
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Distribution of types Consider two distributions F, G and suppose that F
first orderly stochastically dominates G, that is F(x) < G(x) ∀x ∈ (0, 1). Since
wlog we have assumed that p¯(θ) is monotonically increasing in θ, then it must
be
∫ θˆ
0 p¯(θ) f (θ)dθ
p¯(θˆ)F(θˆ)
≥
∫ θˆ
0 p¯(θ)g(θ)dθ
p¯(θˆ)G(θˆ)
.
The information premium associated to the distribution F is lower than the
information premium associated to the distribution G. It follows from equiv-
alence (2.14) that in equilibrium the θˆ associated with distribution F is higher.
A shock that tilts the distribution of types to the right (left) can be thought as a
positive (negative) productivity shock. This exercise tells us that in presence of
adverse selection, the response of output will be amplified because of the gen-
eral equilibrium effect that decreases (increases) the number of firms subject to
adverse selection.
2.3 Constrained inefficiency
We have shown that adverse selection may lead to steady states that are ineffi-
cient with respect to the first best. However, can something be done about it?
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Focusing on the first best could be a misleading benchmark, as steady states
with less than full investment may still be constrained optimal. To answer the
efficiency question one has to study whether there exists a government pol-
icy – i.e., a set of taxes and subsidies – such that: (i) it does not require more
information than that available to market participants; (ii) it balances the gov-
ernment’s budget; and (iii) it makes every agent weakly better off, and some
agent strictly better off. We call an intervention feasible if it satisfies (i) and (ii).
Let us start with part (ii). We first assume that the government uses only
two instruments: a lump sum tax τ > 0 on the household sector, and a sub-
sidy to ’opaque’ firms of size φx, for φ ∈ [0, 1]. As it will be clear from our
results, restricting attention to these instruments is without loss of generality.
Because of the informational constraint (i) mentioned above, feasible subsidies
cannot be targeted only at those high types who would not invest absent a
government intervention (i.e., types θ > θˆ). As in Philippon and Skreta (2012),
all types choose to participate in any government scheme which involves in-
vestment subsidies, and it is impossible for the government (as it was for the
market) to screen them. As a result, the subsidy φx can only be contingent on
the decision to invest, and the balanced budget condition reads:
τ = φxF(θˆ(φ))(1− λ) (2.17)
where θˆ(φ) ≥ θˆ is the investment threshold after the government’s interven-
tion.
As for point (iii), in the analysis we distinguish two cases: χ = 1 and χ < 1.
The case χ = 1 corresponds to an economy where there is no conflict of in-
terest between households and entrepreneurs as the entrepreneurs do not get
any utility from direct consumption and give all the profits back to the house-
hold. Hence, the government is not constrained by distributional concerns.
The case χ < 1 instead corresponds to an economy where households and
entrepreneurs may have diverging interests as the households receive only a
fraction χ of the profits, while entrepreneurs consume the remaining fraction
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1− χ.
2.3.1 No distributional concerns χ = 1
In this section we show that if all the profits are given back to the household
(χ = 1), a strong result applies: the government can always achieve the first
best and support a steady state with full investment. To see this, first notice
that under χ = 1 the household budget constraint evaluated at the steady
state boils down to the aggregate resource constraint
C = Z1−αKα − δK− [λ+ (1− λ)F(θˆ)]x.
This implies that: i) φ does not directly affect steady state consumption C,
ii) ∂C
∂θˆ
= (ζ(1− α)kα − x) (1 − λ) f (θˆ), hence, if investment has net positive
present value, consumption is monotonically increasing in θˆ. It follows that
under assumption (2) every intervention that increases the number of invest-
ing entrepreneurs represents a Pareto improvement. Moreover, the first best
is achieved at full investment θˆ = 1. It is then easy to show the following
proposition.
Proposition 13. If χ = 1, every steady state such that θˆ < 1 is constrained subop-
timal. In particular, there always exists a policy φ that supports a steady state with
θˆ = 1.
Proof. At full investment, the information premium is H(1) = p(1)E[p(θ)|θ≤1] . More-
over, since we are in steady state, it must be that R = β−1. The marginal en-
trepreneur is θˆ = 1 invests if and only if
H(1)x(1− φ) ≤ βζ(1− α)kα.
Rearranging, we get:
φ ≥ H(1)x− βζ(1− α)k
α
H(1)x
.
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Full investment is efficient whenever x ≤ βζ(1− α)kα. Plugging inside yields:
1 ≥ φ ≥ 1− 1H(1) , which always holds since H(1) ≥ 1. Moreover, an equi-
librium with θˆ < 1 exists only if xH(θ¯) ≥ βζ(1 − α)kα, which implies that
φ ≥ βζ(1−α)kαxH(1)
(
H(1)
H(θ¯) − 1
)
≤ 0, where the latter inequality follows from the
definition of H(θ¯), which is the maximum H(θ) over θ ∈ [0, 1].
The result holds because when χ = 1 the households will fully benefit
from every increase in production. An interesting question is whether a Pareto
improving intervention can be devised even in presence of distributional con-
cerns. We explore this question in the next section.
2.3.2 Distributional concerns χ < 1
If χ < 1 part of the intervention represents a private rent to the entrepreneurs,
hence the household might not necessarily benefit from full investment. To
discuss under which conditions an intervention might be warranted, it is use-
ful to start from considering how entrepreneurs are affected by the policy. This
is summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma 5. The participation constraint for the entrepreneurs is never binding. Every
entrepreneur is at least as well off from an intervention φ > 0. Moreover, the utility
of entrepreneurs as a group is monotonically increasing in φ.
Proof. Crucial to the result is the fact that the steady state level of capital per
productive firm k is pin down by the parameters of the economy and is neither
affected by φ, nor by θˆ. Hence, entrepreneurs’ revenue at the steady state is not
affected by the intervention. It follows that ’transparent’ entrepreneurs that do
not receive the subsidy are as well off as compared to the laissez faire. So are
the θ-type ’opaque’ entrepreneurs that do not invest under the policy as well
as the marginal type (i.e. the set of θ-type entrepreneurs such that θ ≥ θˆ(φ)).
It is immediate to see that, by decreasing the pooling rate, the subsidy will
make the set of θ-type ’opaque’ entrepreneurs such that θ < θˆ(φ) strictly better
off. Since θˆ(φ) is monotonically increasing in φ, by increasing the number of
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investing types, a higher subsidy φ increases the utility of the entrepreneurs as
a group.
This result tells us that to characterize the set of Pareto improving interven-
tions, it is sufficient to look at the set of policies that make the household better
off as compared to the laissez faire. Let C(φ) be the steady state consumption of
the representative household as a function of the policy φ. From the household
budget constraint, this can be expressed as
C(φ) = (α+ χ(1− α))Z1−αKα − δK− [λ+ (1− λ)F(θˆ(φ))]x
+
(
1− χ
β
)
[λ+ (1− λ)(1− φ)F(θˆ(φ))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ B(φ)
x. (2.18)
We can define the Pareto set as follows.
Definition 6. Pareto set:
Φ ≡ {φ | C(φ) > C(0)}.
Let φE be the policy that maximizes the utility of the entrepreneurs, then,
by definition (6) together with lemma (5), it must be:
Lemma 6. φE = sup{Φ}.
We can now characterize the Pareto set. From (2.18), notice that φ enters
directly the equation from consumption through the term B(φ). However, this
term is non-linear and absent more restrictive assumptions on the distribu-
tion of types F(θ), the derivative ∂B(φ)∂φ (the derivation is shown in appendix),
cannot be signed. Not being able to establish global regularity conditions on
the function C(φ) prevents us from deriving global conditions for a Pareto im-
proving intervention. However, we are still able to establish a local condition
around the laissez faire equilibrium. The following proposition answers the
question whether there exists a marginal intervention that can improve upon
the market equilibrium.
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Proposition 14. Let βζpi(k)x < H(1). A local Pareto improving government inter-
vention exists if and only if:
− ∂
∂θˆ(φ)
(
E[ p¯(θ)|θ ≤ θˆ(φ)]
p¯(θˆ(φ))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
increase in mispricing for the marginal type
≤ f (θˆ)
F(θˆ)
[
(1− β) [x + ζk] + χ(βζ(1− α)kα − x)
(1− χ)βζpi(k)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Household’s gain from investment
where θˆ is the ‘best’ steady state for the household, absent government interventions.
Proof. The expression follows from the first derivative of equation 2.14 evalu-
ated at no intervention (i.e., φ = 0). To derive it, simply observe that: (i) when
φ = 0 we have
(
1− βζpi(k)x E[ p¯(θ)|θ≤θˆ(φ=0)]p¯(θˆ(φ=0))
)
= 0; (ii) βζpi(k)x > 0, and (iii) because
of Assumption 2 we also know that F(θˆ) > 0.
Proposition (14) identifies a sufficient condition for constrained subopti-
mality of the equilibria of our economy. The ’best’ competitive equilibrium
allocation is locally suboptimal if the rise in mispricing is bounded above, and
it is more than compensated by the respective increase in the aggregate invest-
ment. Intuitively, the government raises funds from the households, through
the tax τ. The household sector is better off after a government’s interven-
tion only if the increase in its proceeds from capital lease and additional loans,
more than offset the tax. In turns, the increase in profits from capital leases are
proportional to the rise in aggregate demand for capital by the entrepreneurial
sector. The condition in (14) states that the minimal subsidy which induces a
marginally higher fraction of types to invet needs to be small enough, relative
to the corresponding increase in the fraction of investment types.
In Figure 2.3 we provide an example of constrained suboptimality. This
example uses the calibration in section (2.4) and plot the threshold θˆ as a func-
tion of the cost of investment x in four scenarios: (i) in the full information
benchmark; (ii) at the laissez faire equilibrium (Unregulated market); (iii) at
the optimal subsidy for the household φH (Regulated Market, H); and (iv) at
the optimal subsidy for the entrepreneurs φE (Regulated Market, F).
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FIGURE 2.3: An example of constrained suboptimality
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Note: the figure obtains for the parametrization in table (2.1)
2.4 Informational shock
So far, we characterized analytically the steady states of the non-stochastic ver-
sion of our economy; we provided conditions for the steady states to be con-
strained suboptimal; and we discussed how a government can set-up a bal-
anced budget policy to implement a Pareto improvement. Such policy involve
consumption taxes on households, and investment subsidies to firms subject
to informational asymmetries.
We now want to look at the dynamics of the economy in response to the
informational shocks we introduced in equation (2.9). Following standard prac-
tices, we study the local dynamics around the ‘best’ deterministic steady state
of our economy and we draw impulse responses to a negative shock that de-
creases λ, that is, increases the pool of firms subject to asymmetric information.
2.4.1 Calibration
To solve the model, we need to make assumptions on the functional form of
the distribution of types F(θ) as well as the entrepreneurs’ probability of being
productive p(θ). We assume that i) types are uniformly distributed, i.e. F(θ) ∼
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TABLE 2.1: Parameters used in the calibration
Parameter Value Target
α 0.36
β 0.99
γ 2
δ 0.025
λ 1
x/Y 0.122 θˆ = 0.7
ζ 0.2
a
ρθ 0.8
ρ 0.9
χ 1
U[0, 1], ii) p(θ) is affine in θ, i.e. p(θ) = a + ρθθ. Moreover we assume that the
household utility is a CRRA of the form u(c) = c1−γ/(1− γ). A summary of
the parameters are presented in table (2.1).
The calibration is quarterly. The values for α, δ, β and γ are standard in
the literature. We assume that at the steady state there is full information,
λ = 1, and the economy operates at full investment. Investment increases the
probability of being productive ζ by 20 percent. However, we assume that 30
percent of the entrepreneurs would not invest if subject of asymmetric infor-
mation (θˆ = 0.7). To target this value, the cost of investment x is set to about
12 percent of GDP.
2.4.2 Impulse response functions
We consider a one time negative shock to λ that affects 20 percent of the firms.
We solve the model using the perfect foresight simulation algorithm imple-
mented in Dynare which uses the Fair and Taylor (1983) method. This method
imposes certainty equivalence on the nonlinear model, as such, it traces out
the implications of not linearizing the equilibrium equations without shock
uncertainty. We therefore compute impulse responses under perfect foresight
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starting from the non-stochastic steady state. The results are presented in fig-
ure (2.4).
A negative shock to λ decreases entrepreneurs’ demand for credit: B falls
on impact of about 5 percent. In response to the decrease in investment oppor-
tunities, households relocate savings toward investment in physical capital I
that increases of about 2 percent. The overshooting of investment in capital de-
spite the decline in its marginal productivity - the interest rate R falls about 1
percent - might seem counterintuitive at first. However, it is explained by two
facts: i) output Y does not fall on impact as the response of output is lagged by
one period, ii) expectations of lower output in the future increase precaution-
ary savings. Consumption decreases marginally and the excess of savings is
redirected toward the unique alternative investment opportunity, i.e. physical
capital. Interestingly, the model is able to generate a dynamic which resembles
a fly-to-quality. However, differently from the supply side literature where a
fly-to-quality originates from constraints in the supply of credit, in our model
the driver is a contraction in the demand generated by the emergence of an
information premium.
As output contracts, investment in physical capital declines and remains
subdue for a prolonged period of time. The decline in the number of produc-
tive entrepreneurs causes the capital per productive entrepreneur to increase
and the marginal product of capital to decline. In turn this provides incentive
to reduce the capital stock. On the other hand, after the initial drop, B picks
us over time as λ reverts back to its steady state value, helping to restore the
productivity of capital. The net effect is that the capital stock declines for 20
quarters before slowly recovering. The slow recovery of investment following
the great recession has often been advocated as a ’puzzle’ as traditional RBC
models would predict a fast recovery in both investment and the capital stock.
Notably, in our setting an informational shock is able to generate a very slow
recovery of capital and investment even absent any adjustment cost.
A last question concerns how the degree of adverse selection inside the
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FIGURE 2.4: Impulse Responses to an informational shock
Note: The figure shows impulse-responses to a one time shock to λ
solved using Dynare perfect foresight algorithm based on Fair and
Taylor (1983). Results are presented in percentage deviation from the
steady state.
pool of ’opaque entrepreneurs’, summarized by θˆ, evolves over time. Looking
at the last two quadrant in figure 2.4, it is clear that the dynamic of θˆ mirrors
movements in the interest rate. The decline in R acts as a countervailing force
to the decline in λ, mitigating the adverse selection problem. On impact θˆ rises
of about 4 percent with respect to the steady state, to then decline over time.
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we study a stylized Real Business Cycle model in which a frac-
tion of entrepreneurs are opaque in that subject to informational asymmetries.
When adverse selection is not severe, competitive allocations are efficient and
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the economy operates at full investment; however, if informational asymme-
tries are sufficiently strong, competitive equilibria feature underinvestment.
We show that a balance-budget policy which does not require more informa-
tion than the information market participants have and that subsidizes in-
vestment and taxes consumption can improve upon the market allocation at
the steady state. Absent intervention, the resulting competitive equilibria are
therefore constrained suboptimal.
We then use our framework to study the effect of purely informational
shocks, interpreted as shocks that shift the proportion of entrepreneurs subject
to asymmetric information. We show that, in presence of adverse selection,
these shocks may be an important driver of business cycle fluctuations. In
particular, they are able to generate prolonged periods of low investment and
low growth, despite the absence of any fundamental shock to the production
possibilities of the economy.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Fiscal Limits and
Fiscal-Monetary Interactions
3.1 Introduction
In recent years monetary policy has played a prominent role in the determi-
nation of fiscal sustainability in advanced countries. Measures of monetary
easing adopted by central banks aimed at sustaining inflation and economic
activity have depressed interest rates and thus helped fiscal authorities service
their debt. Yet, the zero lower bound (ZLB) has constrained the role of mon-
etary policy as a counter-cyclical tool, calling for an active role of fiscal policy
in business cycle stabilization. Despite near zero interest rates, expansionary
fiscal policies and fiscal policy shocks due to financial sector bailouts, in some
cases have contributed to increases in risk premia on government debt and
undermine market confidence. Looking forward, the perspective of a normal-
ization of interest rates, raises further concerns on future debt sustainability in
many advanced economies, e.g. Beck and Wieland (2017).
In light of these consideration, the impact of monetary policy on the sus-
tainability of public debt and, in turn, the ensuing implications for the trans-
mission of public spending shocks are of particular relevance in the current
policy debate. In this paper, we focus on three main questions:
1. How does the degree of monetary policy activeness affect fiscal sustain-
ability?
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2. How is fiscal sustainability affected by persistent periods at the ZLB?
3. How does the response of monetary policy affect the sustainability of
spending shocks?
This paper explores these issues through the lens of a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model (DSGE) based on the seminal work of Bi (2012)
. Fiscal sustainability is interpreted as the probability that the country will
be able to service its debt in the future. Central to this class of models is the
concept of fiscal limit, which is obtained by simulating the present discounted
value of all maximum future primary surpluses conditional on the initial state
of the economy.
Compared to the existing literature, we introduce two main innovations.
First, differently from Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2013) , who, in computing the fis-
cal limit, assume that the monetary authority is always able to peg inflation to
the target, we assume that the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule. Infla-
tion dynamics then affect the fiscal limit distributions that become endogenous
to monetary policy. Second, we introduce a consumption preference shock as
in Erceg and Lindé (2014), in order to mimic the economic developments that
made the ZLB binding during the recent crisis. On the one hand, the intro-
duction of a demand-side shock allows us to analyze how changes in the con-
sumption/saving behavior of households affect the government’s capacity to
service its debt at and away from the ZLB. On the other hand, our framework
make it possible to study the consequences on fiscal sustainability of a fiscal
policy shock when monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB and government
debt is risky.
Our results indicate that the responsiveness of monetary policy to changes
in inflation can considerably affect fiscal sustainability. A looser monetary pol-
icy stance – i.e., a lower coefficient in the Taylor rule – implies larger fluctu-
ations of inflation away from its target in response to exogenous shocks. In
turn, this leads to higher price adjustment costs, lower output and a smaller
tax base, which negatively affect fiscal sustainability.
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In addition, our analysis suggests that to assess the effect on debt sustain-
ability of aggregate demand shocks is important to distinguish the two chan-
nels at play. An aggregate demand shock, by lowering output, decreases the
tax revenue (growth channel), but also depresses interest rates reducing inter-
est repayments (interest rate channel). These two channels move in opposite
direction. A binding ZLB, by preventing monetary accommodation, amplifies
the growth channel, while muting the interest rate channel with detrimental
consequences on fiscal sustainability. Indeed, while the government has the
possibility to increase the tax rate, using it as an imperfect substitute for mon-
etary policy in order to support inflation, this is costly in terms of output and
the resulting tax revenue is depressed.
Finally, we find that making the debt limit endogenous to monetary policy
and ZLB considerations is important to better understand the transmission of
spending shocks. In normal times, a looser monetary policy stance reduces
the margin for expansionary spending shocks, which, by increasing spreads,
after the initial expansion may induce a recessionary phase as distortionary
taxation has to increase to stabilize debt. In contrast, we find that the positive
macroeconomic effects of public spending shocks are larger at the ZLB when
monetary policy is constrained and a government spending shock may actu-
ally improve debt sustainability. However, the effectiveness of the spending
shock depends on the underlying monetary policy stance. A more responsive
monetary policy is better able to peg inflation expectations to the target. In
turns this dampens the deflationary pressure during periods of binding ZLB,
allowing the real interest rate to fall further down, this way sustaining aggre-
gate demand and increasing the fiscal space for the government.
Our analysis is linked to the literature studying the implications of the fis-
cal theory of the price level on inflation determination, and the different com-
bination of active/passive fiscal and monetary policy (see Davig, Leeper, and
Walker (2011) and Leeper and Leith (2016) among others). Differently from
them, however, we study how active monetary policy regimes or temporary
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suspension of monetary policy rules (i.e. periods of binding ZLB) affect debt
limits.
In the spirit of Bi (2012), we model sovereign default as a random event,
whose likelihood increases with the level of debt. Hence, we do not propose
a theory for sovereign default, as in Uribe (2006), where the focus is on the
equilibrium behaviour of default rates and sovereign risk premia. Rather, our
objective is to analyse how the maximum amount of debt that a country is able
to tolerate changes depending on the type of monetary policy followed and
by the fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals. Moreover, the paper focuses
on the capacity to pay, rather than the willingness to pay, instead a crucial ele-
ment of the analysis of Arellano (2008). We also abstract from considerations
of self-fulfilling dynamics and multiple equilibria as in Lorenzoni and Wern-
ing (2013) or on the capacity of monetary policy to prevent them as in Corsetti
and Dedola (2016).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the gen-
eral equilibrium model. Section 3.3 presents the methodology for its numerical
solution alongside the calibration parameters. Section 3.4 assesses the role of
monetary policy and the ZLB in the determination of the debt limit. Section
3.5 introduces our forward-looking fiscal indicator. In section 3.6, finally, we
apply our fiscal indicator to evaluate the role of spending shocks in a set of
policy scenarios, including the analysis of periods of binding ZLB. Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 The model
The model builds on the works by Bi (2012) and Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2013) by
introducing preference shocks á la Erceg and Lindé (2014) and allowing for the
presence of a ZLB on the nominal risk-free interest rate. Time is discrete and
denoted as t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞. The closed economy is populated by a represen-
tative household, who consumes, works, owns monopolistically competitive
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firms producing differentiated intermediate goods and perfectly competitive
firms producing a homogeneous final good, and invests in two types of state-
noncontingent assets, namely risk-free bonds and risky (i.e., defaultable) gov-
ernment bonds.
3.2.1 The representative household
The representative household maximizes the following initial utility function:
max
{Ct,Nt,Bt,BFt }∞t=0
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
(Ct − Cνt)1−γ
1− γ −
χ0
1+ 1χ
N
1+ 1χ
t
]
, (3.1)
subject to the flow budget constraint:
Ct +
Bt
Rt
+
BFt
RFt
= (1− τt)(WtNt + Υt) + Zt +
Bdt−1
Πt
+
BFt−1
Πt
, (3.2)
where E0 denotes the expectations operator, β the household’s discount fac-
tor, γ its relative risk aversion and χ its Frisch elasticity. Moreover, Ct denotes
private consumption, Nt hours of labour, τt the tax rate on wage income and
profits, Wt the (real) wage rate, Υt the representative firm’s profits, Πt (gross)
inflation, Zt transfers from the government to the households, Bt risky (i.e.
defaultable) government bonds, with associated (gross) interest rate Rt, and
BFt risk-free bonds, with associated (gross) interest rate R
F
t , at time t. Notice
that Bdt−1 ≡ (1 − ∆t)Bt−1 denotes the part of real outstanding debt actually
repaid and ∆t is the haircut on outstanding debt in case of default. As in
Erceg and Lindé (2014), the utility function depends on the household’s cur-
rent consumption Ct as deviation from a reference level Cνt. The exogenous
consumption taste shock νt lowers the reference level and marginal utility of
consumption and follows an AR(1) process
νt = (1− ρv)ν+ ρννt−1 + σνet, et ∼ N(0, 1). (3.3)
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The first order conditions of the household problem define the following labor
supply schedule
Nt =
[
(1− τt)Wt
χ0 (Ct − Cνt)γ
]χ
, (3.4)
and the standard consumption Euler equation for riskless bonds
1
RFt
= βEt
[(
Ct+1 − Cνt+1
Ct − Cνt
)−γ 1
Πt+1
]
. (3.5)
The Euler equation for the (risky) government bonds reads
1
Rt
= βEt
[
(1− ∆t+1)
(
Ct+1 − Cνt+1
Ct − Cνt
)−γ 1
Πt+1
]
. (3.6)
where
∆t =
0 if Bt−1 < B
∗
t
δ if Bt−1 > B∗t ,
(3.7)
where δ is the size of the haircut if default. As in Bi (2012), the default scheme
depends on the effective fiscal limit B∗t . Each period B∗t is drawn stochastically
from the distribution of fiscal limits conditional on the state of the economy at
time t, as explained in section (3.2.6).
3.2.2 Final goods production
The single final output good Yt is produced using a continuum of differenti-
ated intermediate goods Yt(i). Competitive final good firms buy the differen-
tiated goods produced by intermediate goods producers and combine them
according to an aggregate function which has the CES (constant elasticity of
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substitution) form
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
. (3.8)
Cost minimization for final good producers results in the demand curve for
the generic intermediate good i
Yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
Yt (3.9)
and an associated price index for the final good
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
. (3.10)
3.2.3 Intermediate goods production
A continuum of intermediate goods Yt(i) for i ∈ [0, 1] is produced by monop-
olistically competitive firms, each of which produces a single differentiated
good. Intermediate goods firms are subject to Rotemberg adjustment costs that
penalise large price changes in excess of steady-state inflation rates. Producer
i’s maximisation problem reads
max
Pt(i)
E0
∞
∑
t=0
RF0,t
[
Pt(i)Yt(i)−mctPtYt(i)− φ2
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)Π
− 1
)2
PtYt
]
(3.11)
s.t. Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
Yt, (3.12)
where RF0,t ≡ βt
[
Ct−Cνt
C0−Cν0
]−γ
, is the household discount factor, Pt(i) is the price
chosen by firm i and Pt is the nominal aggregated price level. Intermediate
good producers are endowed with a linear production function
Yt(i) = AtNt(i) (3.13)
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where At is total factor productivity which follows an exogenous AR(1) pro-
cess of the form
ln At = (1− ρv) ln A + ρ A ln At−1 + σAet, et ∼ N(0, 1) (3.14)
which, in equilibrium, implies the real marginal cost mct = Wt/At.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the first-order condition gives the non-linear New
Keynesian Phillips curve under Rotemberg pricing
(1− θ) + θmct − φΠtΠ
(
Πt
Π
− 1
)
+ φβEt
[(
Ct+1 − Cνt+1
Ct − Cνt
)−γ Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1
Π
(
Πt+1
Π
− 1
)]
= 0
(3.15)
where φ parametrizes Rotemberg (quadratic) price adjustment costs and θ is
the elasticity of substitution between goods. Intermediate goods producers’
monopolistic real profits are:
Υt = Yt −mctYt − φ2
(
Πt
Π
− 1
)2
Yt. (3.16)
3.2.4 Fiscal and Monetary Policy
The government budget constraint is determined by the following equation
Bt
Rt
+ Tt =
(1− ∆t)Bt−1
Πt
+ Gt + Zt
where Bt is real debt, ∆t is the haircut in case of default, Tt is tax revenue, Gt is
government consumption and Zt are fiscal transfers to the household. Public
consumption follows an exogenous AR(1) process:
log Gt = (1− ρG) log G + ρG log Gt−1 + σGεt, εt ∼ N(0, 1) (3.17)
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while fiscal transfers and labor tax rate respond to debt-targeting rules:
Zt = max{Z− µz(Bt − B) + ηzt , Z}, (3.18)
τt = τ + µ
τ(Bt − B) (3.19)
where B denotes the steady-state real debt level and Z indicates the minimum
level of transfers politically feasible,1 while
ηzt = ρ
τηzt−1 + σ
zεz, εzt ∼ N(0, 1) (3.20)
Tax revenue is given by:
Tt = τt(WtNt + Υt). (3.21)
Turning to the central bank, it is assumed to follow a (truncated) Taylor rule
subject to the zero lower bound (ZLB):
RFt = max
{
RF
(
Πt
Π
)α
ηR, 1
}
(3.22)
where Π is the target inflation rate and ηR is a monetary policy shock
ηRt = ρ
τηRt−1 + σ
RεR, εRt ∼ N(0, 1). (3.23)
3.2.5 Aggregate resource constraint
Closing the model economy, the aggregate resource constraint is given by
Ct + Gt = Yt
[
1− φ
2
(
Πt
Π
− 1
)2]
, (3.24)
whereby transfers Zt cancel out as they simply redistribute resources between
the household and the government.
1Parameter z aims at capturing the political constraints faced by the government in provid-
ing households with a minimum level of transfers.
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3.2.6 Distribution of the fiscal limits
Following Bi (2012), we quantify the risk of sovereign default starting from fis-
cal limits that arise from the tax revenue side of the government’s budget con-
straint in presence of distortionary taxation. At the peak of the Laffer curve,
tax revenues reach their maximum and, for a given level of total government
expenditures, the present value of primary surpluses is maximised. Revenues,
expenditures and discount rate vary with the shocks hitting the economy, gen-
erating a distribution for the maximum debt-GDP level that can be supported.
Differently from Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2013) , who, in computing the fiscal
limits, assume that the monetary authority is always able to peg inflation to
the target, we assume that the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule and we
allow inflation to vary around its steady state. Inflation dynamics then affect
the fiscal limit distributions that become endogenous to monetary policy. That
allows us to study how the fiscal limits depend on the monetary policy stance
and respond to the presence of occasionally binding ZLB constraints.
Formally, the stochastic processes governing the exogenous state induce
stochastic processes for both the tax rate τmaxt and the associated maximum tax
revenue Tmaxt . Hence, we can write
Tmaxt = T
max(At, νt, Gt, ηzt , η
R
t )
where the function Tmax maps the current state into the tax revenue at the
peak of the Laffer curve. The fiscal limit is defined as the discounted sum of
expected maximum primary surpluses in all future periods.
B∗ = E
∞
∑
t=0
βtβp
1
RFt
[
Tmax(At, νt, Gt, ηzt , η
R
t )− Gt − Z
]
(3.25)
where 1
RFt
= β
[
C(At+1,νt+1,Gt+1,ηzt+1,η
R
t+1)−Cνt+1
C(At,νt,Gt,ηzt+1,η
R
t+1)−Cνt
]−γ (
1
Π(At+1,νt+1,Gt+1,ηzt+1,η
R
t+1)
)
.
The stochastic discount factor is obtained when tax rates are at the peak of the
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Laffer curve, but modified to allow for a political risk parameter βp. The dis-
tribution of fiscal limits are then computed using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
simulations. However, while the assumption of a fixed inflation rate allows to
compute debt limits independently from the model solution, letting inflation
free to vary requires solving the full non-linear model first before computing
Monte Carlo simulations.
3.3 Numerical solution and calibration
The model is solved in two stages. In the first stage, in order to simulate the
debt limit distributions, the model is solved conditional on the government
setting the tax rate at the peak of the Laffer curve. In the second stage, the
model is solved conditional on the government following the tax rule 3.19.
The debt limit distributions obtained in the first stage are used to compute the
state contingent probability of default at each point in time according to 3.7.
The use of a nominal model presents several problems. The most promi-
nent one is that the computation of the debt limit distributions are not any-
more independent on the equilibrium conditions of the model, as they are in
Bi (2012) and Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2013) . The specific problem lies in the fact
that the revenue-maximising tax rate (i.e., the peak of the Laffer curve, which
is crucial in the determination of the debt limit distribution) now depends non-
linearly on the real wage and the inflation rate. No functional form is available
to determine the equilibrium level of these three endogenous variables. Hence,
the equilibrium relationships of the three variables need to be solved numeri-
cally, given specific values for the state variables and the parameters.
The introduction of a risk-free bond allows us to simplify the computation
of the maximum tax rate, the crucial element in the derivation of the debt limit,
while preserving the unique equilibrium relation among the endogenous vari-
ables, given the state variables and the parameters of the model. Indeed, the
introduction of a risk-free bond alongside the government bond allows us to
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pin down the path of consumption independently of the probability of default.
Hence, when we solve the model for the maximum tax rate, the real wage and
the inflation rate, we need not consider government debt, with considerable
benefits in terms of computational time.
Given this assumption, we limit the number of state variables to five (TFP,
government consumption, discount factor shock, transfers, monetary policy
shock) and the number of numerically determined control (or jump) variables
to three. Notice that a “solution of the model” includes a set (i.e., matrix) of
one-to-one relationships between a specific value for the vector of state vari-
ables and a specific value for the vector of control variables. So, the model
needs to be solved only once before the simulation of the debt limit distribu-
tion. When we calculate the debt limit distributions all the control variables
are readily available as a function of the state variables either through func-
tional forms or through the one-to-one relationships between state and control
variables established in our first step. The solution strategy is presented in
Appendix B.1 and relies upon the monotone map method based on Coleman
(1991) and Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2011) . The use of global solution meth-
ods allows us to deal explicitly with the non-linearities associated with the ZLB
constraint.
The calibration is presented in table 3.1. The model is calibrated at quarterly
frequencies. The calibration is heavy reliant on Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2013) that
calibrate fiscal parameters to match average EU-14 data from 1971 to 2007. In
steady state, government purchases (public consumption) are 21 percent of
GDP and lump-sum transfers are 18 percent of GDP. The tax adjustment pa-
rameter (µτ) is calibrated to 0.5 at an annual rate, which is close to the average
of estimates in EU-14, and the tax rule targets a debt to GDP ratio of 110 per-
cent for ’high-debt countries’. We set the Frisch elasticity to 0.42 which is close
to the value used by Lindé and Trabandt (2017), who use the same specifica-
tion for the discount factor shock. Upon default, we assume a haircut of 10
percent as in Cruces and Trebesch (2013) . The other parameters are standard
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Parameters Value Source
Discount factor β 0.99 BLL (2013)
Risk aversion γ 1 BLL (2013)
Public consumption/GDP g/y 21% BLL (2013)
Transfers/GDP z/y 18% BLL (2013)
Tax rule µτ 0.5/4 BLL (2013)
Inflation pi 3% (annual) BLL (2013)
Taylor rule α 1.5 BLL (2013)
Debt/GDP b/y 110% (annual) high-debt country
Frisch elasticity 1/χ 0.42 Linde and Trabandt (2017)
Haircut if default δ 10% Cruces and Trebesch (2013)
TFP a 1 standard
Labor supply n 1 standard
TFP shocks ρa 0.85 standard
TFP shocks σa 0.022 standard
Preference shocks ρν 0.85 standard
Preference shocks σν 0.022 standard
Public consumption shocks ρg 0.85 standard
Public consumption shocks σg 0.01 standard
MP shocks ρr 0.85 standard
MP shocks σr 0.01 standard
TABLE 3.1: Calibration
in the literature.
3.4 Monetary policy stance and debt limit determi-
nation
This section studies the role played by monetary policy in the determination of
the debt limit distributions. Monetary policy can affect debt limits by reducing
interest payments (direct interest rate channel) and by affecting the level of
economic activity and, as a consequence, the path of primary balances (indirect
growth channel). The analysis will first show the impact of pure monetary
policy shocks, in which the interest channel plays a prominent role. To explore
the role of the indirect growth channel we study different degrees of reactivity
to changes in inflation in the monetary policy rule (α in eq. 3.22) and then
evaluate the determination of debt limits during periods of binding zero-lower
bound constraint.
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FIGURE 3.1: Impact of monetary policy shocks on debt limit dis-
tributions
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Note: Debt limit distributions after monetary policy shocks reducing
(red solid line) and increasing (black dashed/dotted-line) the risk-less
interest rate . The blue dashed line indicates the debt distribution when
the interest rate shock eRt is at steady state.
This analysis sheds light into an important aspect of fiscal-monetary pol-
icy interactions, often overlooked in the DSGE literature. Even in most recent
studies (see, for example, Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2013)), inflation is fixed at its
steady-state level when debt limit distributions are computed, so that no role
is played by inflation and, thus, monetary policy in determining fiscal sustain-
ability. In contrast, we allow inflation to drift away from its target in response
to shocks in fundamentals and policy, so that we can evaluate the impact of
these shocks on the sustainability of public debt under different macroeco-
nomic conditions and policy regimes.
Figure 3.1 shows the impact on the debt limit distribution of both contrac-
tionary and expansionary monetary policy shocks as applied to the baseline
calibration. The direct interest rate channel and the indirect growth channel
move debt limits in the same direction. An expansionary shock is associate
with a reduction in interest rates and an increase in output. This increases debt
sustainability, as it reduces the probability that the debt limit will be below any
given level of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
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FIGURE 3.2: Impact of monetary policy shocks on debt limit dis-
tributions
100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190
bt/y¯ (%)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
CDF with constrained (solid) and unconstrained (dashed) MP
α = 1.5
α = 2
α = 2.5
Note: The figure presents how the debt limit distributions change for
three different values of the inflation coefficient in the Taylor rule (1.5,
2 and 2.5). The dotted value reports the debt limit distribution without
imposing the zero-lower bound constraint. In all these simulations all
other variables and shocks are set initially at their steady state value.
Figure 3.2 shows how different degrees of responsiveness of the risk-free
interest rate RFt to inflation Πt affect the debt limit distribution at the steady
state. We do this by taking into account three different values of α: 1.5 (con-
sensus), 2 (strong) and 2.5 (very strong). The sustainability of debt clearly
improves with stronger responsiveness of the Taylor rule to inflation. This is
due to the fact that inflation volatility falls the bigger α is, thus reducing the
cost associated with deviations of inflation from the target. This, in turn, lifts
profits and, with them, tax collection. Notice that the magnitude of the shift in
the debt limit distribution is decreasing in α. As α increases, the distribution
tends to converge to the one that would emerge if inflation was pegged to the
target. Figure 3.2 also shows the difference between a model with occasionally
binding ZLB constraints and a model where the ZLB is assumed to never bind.
As expected, the possibility that the ZLB will bind in the future, all else equal,
decreases debt sustainability at the steady state. However, the gap between
the dotted line (where the ZLB is assumed to never bind) and the solid line is
visible for the scenarios with the two lower α, but becomes almost negligible
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FIGURE 3.3: Impact of consumption preference shocks on debt
limit distributions
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Note: The figure shows how the debt limit distributions change for
simulations with an initial positive (high νt, black line) and negative
(low νt, red line) preference shocks. The debt limit distribution with
the preference shock at its steady-state value (mean νt, blue dotted line)
is included for comparison. The left panel shows the debt limit distri-
butions when the ZLB is assumed to bind while the right panel allows
interest rate to take also negative values
when α reaches 2.5.
To better study the role of a binding ZLB on the debt limits we now intro-
duce a consumption preference shocks (νt in equation 3.1). A positive shock
reduces the marginal propensity to consume of the representative household,
which results in a fall in the interest rate, output and inflation. A shock suffi-
ciently strong can bring the economy to a situation of binding ZLB. In case of
a preference shock, the interest rate channel and the indirect growth channel
have opposite effects on the debt limits, as a decrease in the risk free interest
rate is associated with a fall in output. When studying the debt limits at the
ZLB, it is therefore of crucial importance to distinguish the role of the shock
itself from its interaction with the ZLB constraint. This is done in Figure 3.3
by looking at the debt limit distributions under constrained (left panel) and
unconstrained (right panel) monetary policy.
Chapter 3. Dynamic Fiscal Limits and Fiscal-Monetary Interactions 90
FIGURE 3.4: Binding ZLB in an economy at the debt limit
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Note: The chart shows how changes in the tax rate affects the economy
after the negative consumption preference shock, both in a situation in
which the interest rate is left free to adjust and where the ZLB constrain
hold. The first line (from left to right) of the panel report total tax rev-
enue (the real Laffer curve), wage income and output. The second line
includes inflation, the risk-free rate and the expected marginal rate of
substitution.
In a situation in which interest rates are unconstrained, the negative pref-
erence shock actually improves debt sustainability. In such a situation, the
reduction in interest rate that accompanies the reduction in output and infla-
tion improves the capacity of the economy to service debt, and thus shifts the
debt limit distribution to the right. In other words, the interest channel prevails
over the reduction in tax collection triggered by the fall in output. Imposing
the zero-lower bound constraint, however, magnifies the growth channel and
mutes the interest rate channel. For the calibration used in this paper, the ZLB
completely offset the benefits of the reduction in interest rates and brings the
debt limit distribution close to its steady-state value.
Figure 3.4 inspects in detail the impact of a binding ZLB on debt limit de-
termination, in order to understand the mechanism that leads to the adverse
growth effect. The Laffer curve (first chart from the left in the first row) under
the ZLB (red solid line) is not anymore bell-shaped as in the case of no ZBL
(blue dotted line): it presents a kink in correspondence to its maximum value.
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The dynamic of inflation is key to understand the shape of the Laffer curve and
the dynamic of output. With a binding ZLB, monetary policy is not anymore
able to stabilize inflation. The ensuing deflation increases the real interest rate
depressing demand further. To clear the market, the wage rate has to decrease
in order to induce households to work less. By increasing the tax rate on wage
income, the fiscal authority is able to increase the marginal cost for the firms
and support inflation. In turn, higher inflation lowers the real interest rate and
supports private sector demand reducing the fall in wage. Actually, the ZLB
offers to the government a leeway to increase the tax rate, because by doing so,
it is actually able to substitute for monetary policy and reduce the distortions
generated by deflation. The peak of the Laffer curve is then reached at the point
in which the monetary authority is on the edge of the ZLB and inflation is at
the same level that would be in place absent the constraint. Such an operation,
however, is not cost free. Indeed, the tax rate that maximizes tax collection lies
at the right of the no-ZLB peak. The higher tax rate puts downward pressure
on labor supply, leading to a lower level of output and tax revenue. In practice,
in an economy at the ZLB, fiscal policy substitutes for monetary policy: with
an active use of the tax rate, the government supports inflation and through it,
aggregate demand. The increase in the tax rate, however, is not harmless as it
reduces output through a reduction in labor supply. This is due to the reduced
disposable income received for every unit of labor supplied in the market. De-
spite the reduction in output, tax revenues are still substantially higher than
what could be collected with tax rates below the maximizing value, because of
the elevated cost of inflation fluctuations.
In synthesis, this section presented two important results: first, a more ag-
gressive monetary policy stance can improve debt tolerance through a reduc-
tion of the price distortions in the economy; second, fiscal policy tends to repli-
cate the work of monetary policy in an economy where the government wants
to maximize tax revenues and the ZLB binds. These two considerations will
be important in the simulations presented in section 3.6 .
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3.5 Forward-looking fiscal space index
From a normative perspective, an important question is how much the govern-
ment can use fiscal policies to stimulate the economy, without undermining the
sustainability of public finances in the future. In other words, policy makers
may wander what is the ’fiscal space’ of the government. In this section we
show how we can use fiscal limits to define a forward-looking measure of the
fiscal space.
Any measure of fiscal space needs to be defined in terms of a specific fiscal
instrument (i.e., tax rates, government consumption, government investment,
etc.). In fact, in general equilibrium, each instrument has a different impact on
the economy and, thus, on the debt-to-GDP ratio. Let F be the fiscal instrument
in relation to which we want to measure the fiscal space. Let then s−Ft be the
state of the economy (the value taken by all exogenous shocks) at time t, with
the exclusion of the value of the fiscal instrument F. For all variables other than
F, the current state s−Ft determines their future values, in accordance with the
respective assumed data generation process.
Let Bt be government debt at time t and Bˆφ(st) the debt limit corresponding
to a given probability threshold φ conditional on the realization of the state
st. Prior to defining the index, we first need to define an intermediate but
important fiscal variable: the fiscal policy signal FS. FS indicates whether the
level of debt Bt is expected to reach or go beyond the debt limit Bˆ
φ
t between
time t and time t + N. Formally, it is defined as follows:
FSt =
0 if Bt+i < Bˆ
φ
t+i ∀ i ∈ [0, N]
1 otherwise
(3.26)
Let then FFSt be the level (maximum for tax rates, minimum for spending
instruments) of the fiscal instrument F at which the fiscal signal FS takes the
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value of one given the state of the economy s−Ft . 2 The fiscal space available at
time t and relative to the fiscal instrument F can then be defined as
SPFt = (F
FS
t − Ft |s−Ft ) (3.27)
Because of its evident non-linear nature (given the piecewise definition of
the fiscal policy signal FS and of the threshold FFSt ) there is no analytical solu-
tion for SPFt . It needs to be simulated, based on a specific set of initial shocks.
In synthesis, this fiscal index is completely forward looking and takes into
account the general equilibrium implications of changes to the fiscal instru-
ment F. Moreover, it has the interesting property of being state-contingent, as
it depends on the state s−Ft .
3.6 The impact and sustainability of government spend-
ing shocks
This section presents a concrete application of the tools presented above. The
objective is to study the transmission mechanism of government spending
shocks in light of the interaction between monetary policy, debt limits and
ZLB. We perform three exercises which consider the same government spend-
ing shock under different scenarios. In the first we draw impulse-responses
in normal times but under different monetary policy stance α; then, we draw
impulse-responses at the ZLB, comparing the effect of the increase in govern-
ment consumption with a scenario in which no fiscal stimulus is provided;
finally, we repeat the first exercise, but with binding ZLB.
Figure 3.5 shows the effect of a positive shock to government consumption.
The shock has been assumed to last 3 quarters, after which it follows an AR(1)
process with a 0.85 decay parameter. To different α correspond remarkably
2Of course, in this section we assume that such level actually exists. This needs to be veri-
fied.
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different dynamics. An increase in government consumption creates inflation-
ary pressure to which the monetary authority responds by raising the nominal
risk-free interest rate RFt . A more reactive monetary policy (higher α) is better
able to stabilize inflation pit, in turn, the stronger response of the real interest
rate rt dampen the response of output and consumption. Importantly, while
for α = 2 we do not observe any movement in the spread st, for α = 1.5 the
spread increases up to a maximum of 80 basis points after 5 quarters and then
decreases slowly. This is because, as shown in figure 3.2, debt limits are much
lower when α = 1.5. Indeed, debt limits are forward looking and take into ac-
count that the monetary authority will be less able to stabilize future shocks af-
fecting the economy. This has important consequences: the recessionary phase
that follows the initial expansionary effect of the policy, is significantly more
pronounced for α = 1.5. Indeed, the increase in the spread forces the govern-
ment to increase the tax rate τt, which, since taxes are distortionary, reduces
output and crowds out private sector demand.
In figure 3.6, we study the effect of a positive shock to government con-
sumption at the ZLB. The dotted line describes a scenario where no fiscal stim-
ulus is provided, the continuous line describes a scenario where, as in the pre-
vious exercise, government consumption is raised of about 3 percent of steady
state GDP for 3 quarters, and after that it follows an AR(1) process with a 0.85
decay parameter. Consistent with the recent literature on fiscal expansions
at the ZLB, we find that the a positive shock to government consumption is
particularly effective in mitigating the recession, with the drop in output yt
significantly dampened. Rather surprisingly, we find that the spending shock
improves fiscal sustainability at the ZLB: the spread st increases up to a maxi-
mum of about 18 basis point with the shock, while it would have increased to
about 30 basis point absent the shock. At the heart of the result is the fact that
the increase in government expenditure is capable to mitigate significantly the
drop in inflation pit. In turn, the real interest rate rt falls more than absent inter-
vention. The lower real interest rate on the one hand helps to sustain demand,
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FIGURE 3.5: Impact of a 3-quarters government spending shock
for different α
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Note: The figures represent a scenario in which spending is increased
by approximately 3% of (steady-state) GDP for 3 quarters. The solid
line describes the evolution of the economy for α = 1.5, the dotted
line describes the evolution of the economy for α = 2. In the bottom
right panel, the red line indicates the evolution of the 30% debt limit
threshold, i.e., the value on the debt limit distribution that corresponds
to a 30% default probability.
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on the other hand helps the government to finance public expenditure, without
significantly affect the debt level. Indeed, despite the government runs a lower
primary balance pb/y as compared to a situation without shock, debt increases
less than without intervention. In turn, this implies that the government can
afford a lower tax rate τ with positive effects on output.
In figure 3.7, we study the same shock considered in 3.6; however, here we
compare the dynamics that arise respectively with α = 1.5 (the case considered
in 3.6) and α = 2. The two dynamics are remarkably different. For α = 2, the
fact that a more reactive monetary authority is better able to peg expectations
to the target, implies that the deflation following the preference shock that
leads to the ZLB is significantly lower than with α = 1.5. As a consequence, the
real interest rate rt on impact falls much more, helping to stabilize the economy.
Despite the primary balance to GDP, pb/y, decreases substantially to finance
the increase in public expenditure, the stock of debt will actually decrease over
time due to the low interest rate environment. Because of that, the government
is able to decrease marginally the tax rate τ stimulating the demand further.
Both output and consumption fall significantly less. Notice that debt limits
actually increase (both the dashed yellow and red line on the last quadrant),
which results in the absence of spread st.
3.7 Conclusions
We analyzed fiscal sustainability and monetary fiscal policy interactions through
the lens of a DSGE model with risky sovereign debt à la Bi (2012). We found
that a looser monetary policy stance implies larger inflation fluctuations that,
by decreasing output and the tax revenue, negatively affect fiscal sustainabil-
ity. In normal times this reduces the fiscal space available to increase govern-
ment consumption. Indeed, by engaging in expansionary policies, the govern-
ment risks to increase spreads that might reverse the initial stimulative effect
of the policy.
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FIGURE 3.6: Impact of a 3-quarters government spending shock
in presence of binding ZLB
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Note: The figures represent a scenario in which the ZLB is binding due
to a persistent preference shock and α = 1.5. The solid line describes
the evolution of the economy when spending is increased by approx-
imately 3% of (steady-state) GDP for 3 quarters. The dotted line de-
scribes the evolution of the economy absent shock to government con-
sumption. The bottom right panel indicates the evolution of the fiscal
margin corresponding to, respectively, a 30%(red line) and 0.4%(yellow
line) default probability threshold .
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FIGURE 3.7: Impact of a 3-quarters government spending shock
at the ZLB for different α.
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Note: The figures represent a scenario in which the ZLB is binding due
to a persistent preference shock and spending is increased by approxi-
mately 3% of (steady-state) GDP for 3 quarters. The solid line describes
the evolution of the economy for α = 1.5. The dotted line describe
the evolution of the economy for α = 2. The bottom right panel indi-
cates the evolution of the fiscal margin corresponding to, respectively,
a 30%(red line) and 0.4%(yellow line) default probability threshold .
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Consistent with previous findings, at the ZLB an increase in government
expenditure is effective in reducing the fall in output and consumption. No-
tably, it does so without affecting the sustainability of debt, which actually
improves in our calibration. By creating inflationary pressure, an increase in
government consumption is able to reduce the real interest rate. In turn, this
relaxes the ZLB constraint and reduces the cost of servicing the debt. However,
the effectiveness of the policy largely depends on the underlying monetary
policy stance. A more responsive monetary policy in normal times is better
able to peg inflation expectation to the target. In turn, this dampens the defla-
tionary pressure during periods of binding ZLB, allowing the real interest rates
to fall further down, this way sustaining aggregate demand and increasing the
fiscal space for the government.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
1. Proof of 1. The Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated with the investors’
problem in (1.9) is;
(r + λ)V (a, q) = max
a˙
[
−q(a˙ + δa) + (r + δ+ λ)a +V′a a˙ +V′q q˙
]
,
where we have dropped the time indexes for simplicity of notation. Notice that the
assumption of perfect competition and the fact that investors are atomistic implies that
V(a, q) = V˜(q)a, which means that the unit value of an asset must be independent of
the quantity of asset holdings. Then, we have:
(r + λ)V˜(q) = max
a˙
[
−(q− V˜(q)) a˙
a
+ (r + δ(1− q) + λ) + V˜′q q˙
]
.
If q > V˜(q), the price of the asset would be larger than its value and the investors
would like to sell an arbitrarily large number of assets. Viceversa, if q < V˜(q), the price
of the asset would be lower than its value and the investors would demand an infinite
number of assets. It follows that in equilibrium it must be that q = V˜(q). Substituting
this relationship in the above expression we obtain statement 1 of the Proposition.
2. Proof of 2. The value of a bond one instant before default is
q(T − dt) =
∫ T
T−dt
(r + δ+ λ)e−(r+δ+λ)(s−T+dt)ds +
∫ ∞
T
φλe−(r+λ)(s−T)ds
= 1− e−(r+δ+λ)dt + λφ
r + λ
taking the limit for dt→ 0 we get q(T) = λφr+λ .
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3. Proof of 3. Since it is never optimal for the government to default in the high income
state, the value of a bond solves
q(t) =
∫ ∞
t
(r + δ)e−(r+δ)(s−t)ds
and q(t) = 1, ∀t ≥ T j.
A.2 Derivation of the continuous time Euler Equa-
tion in equation (1.18)
Define the current value Hamiltonian:
H(b, p, c, t) = u(c(t)) + λW jb(b(t)) + p(t)b˙(t),
where p(t) is the costate variable, b(t) is the state variable, c(t) is the control variable and u(c)
is a generic utility function which satisfies Inada conditions. The first order conditions of the
optimal control problem are
Hc = 0,
−Hb = p˙(t)− (ρ+ λ)p(t),
Hp = b˙(t).
Substituting the derivatives of the Hamiltonian
q(t)u′(c(t)) = p(t),
λW jb(b(t)) + p(t)
[
ρ+ δ
q(t)
− δ
]
= − p˙(t) + (ρ+ λ)p(t),
b˙(t) =
1
q(t)
(yL − c(t) + (ρ+ δ)b(t))− δb(t),
and consolidating the first two equations:
λW jb(b(t)) + (ρ+ δ)u
′(c(t))− δq(t)u′(c(t)) =− q˙(t)u′(c(t))− q(t)u′′(c(t))c˙(t)+
+ (ρ+ λ)q(t)u′(c(t)). (A.1)
Substituting for q˙(t) = (q(t)− 1)(ρ+ δ+λ) and using the fact that with log-utility− u′′(c(t))c(t)u′(c(t)) =
1 and u′(c(t)) = 1c we obtain (1.18)
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A.3 Derivation of the Terminal conditions in equa-
tion (1.19)-(1.21)
Problem (1.14)-(1.17) requires a simultaneous determination of optimal control and the termi-
nal time. These problems are usually called free terminal time problems and it is well known that
optimality for the terminal time requires an additional transversality condition. Let T be the
terminal time and S(b(T), T, t) denote the salvage value function:
S(b(T), T, t) ≡Wd(b(T))e−(λ+r)(T−t).
At the optimum terminal time, T, the costate variable must satisfy:
p(T) = Sb(b(T), T, t),
while the transversality condition is given by
H(b(T), p(T), c(T), T) + ST(b(T), T, t) = 0.
The transversality condition requires that at the optimal terminal time, the benefit of delaying
default of one instant, given by the Hamiltonian evaluated at T, is equal to opportunity cost
of delaying default, given by the derivative of the salvage function with respect to T. Together
with the budget constraint, the terminal conditions of the problem define a system of three
equations:
log(c(T)) + λW j(b(T)) + p(T)b˙(T) = (ρ+ λ)Wd(b(T))
p(T) = Wdb (b(T)),
b˙(T) =
1
q(T)
[yL − c(T) + (ρ+ δ)b(T)]− δb(T).
Using the fact that p(T) = q(T)c(T) and using (1.12), we get
log(c(T))− log(yL) = λ
[
W j(φb(T))−W j(b(T))
]
−Wdb (b(T)b˙(T)
q(T)
c(T)
= Wdb (b(T))
b˙(T) =
1
q(T)
[yL − c(T) + (ρ+ δ)b(T)]− δb(T).
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By substituting Wdb (b(T)) from equation (1.12), W
j
b(b(T)) from equation (1.11) and q(T) in
(1.17), the system of equations simplifies to
log(c(T))− log(yL) = λ
[
W j(φb(T))−W j(b(T))
]
−Wdb (b(T))b˙(T)
c(T) = yH + rφb(T),
b˙(T) =
ρ+ λ
λφ
[yL − c(T) + (ρ+ δ)b(T)]− δb(T).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Equations (1.26)-(1.28), define a system of three equations in three unknowns, b˙, qP, c, given b.
At the steady state b˙ = 0 the system simplifies to:

c = yL
(
yH+ρφb
yH+ρb
) λ
r
qP = φλρ+λ
(
c
yH+ρφb
)
c− yL = b
[
ρ+ δ(1− qP)]
Unfortunately, as standard for a system of non-linear equations, we cannot prove the existence
of a steady state and, therefore, we have to rely upon numerical solutions. However, provided
that a steady state does exist, we can still study its stability properties. Equations (1.26)-(1.28),
define an autonomous system of three equations in three unknowns, b˙, qP, c, given b. We use
the notation W jb(·) and W
j
bb(·) to denote respectively the first and the second derivative with
respect to b of the function W j(·). Taking derivatives of each equation in the system (1.26)-
(1.28) with respect to b we obtain

1
c
λ
ρ+λW
j
b(φb) 0
− λρ+λW
j
b(φb) 0 1
1 qP b˙ + δb

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A

∂c
∂b
∂b˙
∂b
∂qP
∂b
 =

λ
(
W jb(φb)−W
j
b(b)
)
− λρ+λW
j
bb(φb)b˙
λ
ρ+λW
j
bb(φb)c
ρ+ δ(1− qP)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡v
.
(A.2)
The determinant of A is
det(A) = − q
P
c
+
λ
ρ+ λ
W jb(φb)
(
1+
λ
ρ+ λ
W jb(φb)(b˙ + δb)
)
=
(
λ
ρ+ λ
W jb(φb)
)2
(b˙ + δb).
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where the second equality is obtained substituting for equation (1.27). Let A2 be the matrix
obtained by substituting the second column in A with the vector v, the determinant of A2
reads
det(A2) =
(
λ
ρ+ λ
W jbb(φb)(b˙ + δb)− (r + δ(1− qp))
1
c
)
+
+
(
λ
(
W jb(φb)−W
j
b(b)
)
− λ
ρ+ λ
W jbb(φb)b˙
)(
1+
λ
ρ+ λ
W jb(φb)(b˙ + δb)
)
By Cramer rule, ∂b˙∂b =
det(A2)
det(A) . A steady state is stable if and only if the derivative
∂b˙
∂b evaluated
at the steady state is negative, formally: ∂b˙∂b |b˙=0 < 0. Notice that at the steady state b˙ = 0, and,
therefore, det(A) < 0 since we are restricting our domain of interest on b < 0. Stability follows
if we can show that at the steady state det(A2|b˙ = 0) > 0.
det(A2|b˙ = 0) = − λ
(
W jb(b)−W
j
b(φb)
)
− (r + δ(1− qP))1
c
+
+
λ
ρ+ λ
W jbb(φb)δb +
λ2
ρ+ λ
(
W jb(φb)−W
j
b(b)
)
W jb(φb)δb. (A.3)
The envelope condition associated to the government problem which can be derived by taking
derivatives with respect to b of the Hamiltonian-Jacobian-Bellman equation in 1.26, reads
(
Wdbb −
qP′(b)
qP(b)
)
b˙ = −W
d
b
q
[
ρ+ δ(1− qP)
]
− λ
(
W jb(φb)−W
j
b(b)
)
, (A.4)
and implies that at the steady state
Wdb
q
[
ρ+ δ(1− qP)
]
− λ
(
W jb(φb)−W
j
b(b)
)
= 0
Substituting the FOCs of the planner problem, q
P(t)
c(t) = W
d
b , it follows that we can simplify
det(A2|b˙ = 0) to
det(A2|b˙ = 0) = λ
ρ+ λ
W jbb(φb)δb +
λ2
ρ+ λ
(
W jb(φb)−W
j
b(b)
)
W jb(φb)δb > 0.
The sign follows immediately from the fact that W jbb(φb) < 0,
(
W jb(φb)−W
j
b(b)
)
< 0, W jb(φb) >
0 and b < 0. This proves that if a steady state does exist, it must be stable. In addition, since
the inequality ∂b˙∂b |b˙=0 > 0 is satisfied for any possible steady state in the domain b < 0, it must
be the case that if a steady state exists it must also be unique on this domain. From A.4, we
must also have that on the domain of interest where b˙ < 0, q
P′(b)
qP(b) < 0. That because the RHS
of A.4 is negative for every qP lower than the steady state level, and in order for the LHS to
be negative, since Wdbb < 0, it must be
qP′(b)
qP(b) < 0. Hence, the policy price is decreasing in b, or
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equivalently, increasing in t.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
1. Proof of 1.
At the time of intervention T, qP(b(T)) = φλρ+λ . Therefore, the government budget
constraint in equation (1.28) reads
φλ
ρ+ λ
b˙(T) = yL − c(T) +
(
ρ+ δ
(
1− φλ
ρ+ λ
))
b(T).
Replace the equation above into the last term of the ICC in equation (1.31) and evaluate
the ICC at T:
yL − c(T)− λ(1− φ)b(T)−
[
yL − c(T) +
(
ρ+ δ
(
1− φλ
ρ+ λ
))
b(T)
]
.
Simplifying, it becomes:
−
[
λ(1− φ) +
(
ρ+ δ
(
1− φλ
ρ+ λ
))]
b(T) > 0.
Since all the coefficients are positive, and φ and λ are less then one, the term in square
bracket is positive. Therefore, the ICC at time T is satisfied whenever the government
defaults with some debt b(T) < 0.
2. Proof of 2.
Denote b¯ the steady state level of debt, such that b˙(b¯) = 0. Provided that a steady state
exists, if the intervention is incentive compatible (ICC > 0) at the steady state, then the
intervention will continue until the jump to the high income state. We will show that
this cannot be the case. The system of equations (1.26)-(1.28) at the steady state reads:

c = yL
(
yH+ρφb¯
yH+ρb¯
) λ
ρ ,
qP = φλρ+λ
(
c
yH+ρφb¯
)
,
c− yL = b¯[ρ+ δ(1− qP)].
This proof consists of two parts.
Part 1. First we show that at the steady state b¯, it must be b¯ < yL−yHρ . Define e such that
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b¯ = yL−yHρ + e, we can then rearrange that expression as
yH + ρb¯ = yL + ρe
or equivalently,
yH + ρφb¯ = [φyL + (1− φ)yH ] + φρe.
Define the variable ζ as:
ζ ≡ yH + ρφb¯
yH + ρb¯
=
[φyL + (1− φ)yH ] + φρe
yL + ρe
.
Notice that ζ > 1 since φ ≤ 1 and b¯ < 0. We can now restate the system in terms of ζ
and e as 
c = yLζ
λ
ρ ,
qP =
(
φλ
ρ+λ
)
yLζ
λ
ρ
[φyL+(1−φ)yH ]+φρe
yLζ
λ
ρ − yL =
(
yL−yH+eρ
ρ
) (
ρ+ δ(1− qP)) .
By substituting qP in the third equation:
ζ
λ
ρ
[
yL +
(
yL − yH + eρ
ρ
)
δφλyL
(ρ+ λ) [(φyL + (1− φ)yH) + φρe]
]
=
= yL +
(
yL − yH + eρ
ρ
)
(ρ+ δ).
Now, ζ > 1 and yL + ρe < yH , therefore a necessary condition for the equality to be
satisfied is that
δφλyL
(ρ+ λ) [(φyL + (1− φ)yH) + φρe] > δ+ ρ,
rearranging the inequality
−ρφ(δ+ ρ+ λ)
ρ+ λ
yL − (δ+ ρ)(1− φ)yH > φρe.
which implies e < 0.
Part 2. We can write the first equation of the system above in logs as:
ln(c)− ln(yL) = λρ
[
ln(yH + ρφb¯)− ln(yH + ρb¯)
]
.
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From part 1, at the steady state c ≥ yL which implies, from the government budget
constraint evaluated at the steady state (third equation of the system), that qP ≥ δ+ρδ .
Then
c > yH + ρφb¯.
Moreover, from part 1, we have
yL > yH + ρb¯.
By strict concavity of the logarithmic function (the result is proved in Lemma 7 below),
we have:
ln(c)− ln(yL)
c− yL <
[
ln(yH + ρφb¯)− ln(yH + ρb¯)
ρ(φ− 1)b¯
]
.
Substituting ln(c)− ln(yL) = λρ [ln(yH + ρφb¯)− ln(yH + ρb¯)], we have:
c− yL > λ(φ− 1)b¯.
Hence, the ICC is negative at the steady state. Intuitively, the cost of avoiding default,
c− yL is higher than the benefit for the investors λ(φ− 1)b¯.
Lemma 7. Let C→ R be an open interval, f : C → R is concave iff for any a, b, c, d ∈ C, with
a < b < c < d,
f (c)− f (a)
c− a ≥
f (d)− f (b)
d− b .
Proof. . We first show that:
f (c)− f (a)
c− a ≥
f (d)− f (a)
d− a .
Suppose that f is concave and take any a, b, c, d ∈ C, a < b < c < d. Since (c− a) > 0
and (d− a) > 0, the expression above holds iff:
f (c)− f (a)
c− a ≥
f (d)− f (a)
d− a ,
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which holds iff (collecting terms in f (c)),
f (c) ≥
(
1− c− a
d− a
)
f (a) +
(
c− a
d− a
)
f (d).
Since f is concave, the latter holds taking θ =
(
c−a
d−a
)
∈ (0, 1). Moreover, verifying that
c = (1− θ)a+ (θ)d, any function that satisfies the equation needs indeed to be concave.
f (θd + (1− θ)a) ≥ θ f (d) + (1− θ) f (a).
Similarly we can show that:
f (d)− f (a)
d− a ≥
f (d)− f (b)
d− b .
Collecting terms in f (b),
f (b) ≥
(
1− d− b
d− a
)
f (d) +
(
d− b
d− a
)
f (a).
The previous proof goes through, taking θ =
(
d−b
d−a
)
, and verifying that, indeed, b =
(1− θ)d + (θ)a.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
1. Suppose q(TP|α) > qP(TP), then, by continuity of q and qP, the government would be
better off keep borrowing from the market and delay the intervention. This way it can
relax its budget constraint: by borrowing at an higher price, it can finance the same b˙
but consume more.
2. Suppose q(TP|α) > qP(TP). Then the government would had been better to anticipate
the intervention. The argument is symmetric to the one presented above.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
1. Part 1.
From 1.34, we have that
∂
∂α
∆V(α, 0) = (1− α) ∂
∂α
∫ TE
TP
−G(s)e−(r+λ)(TE−t)ds +
∫ TE
TP
G(s)e−(r+λ)(T
E−t)ds
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Since G(t) is negative ∀t ≥ TP, the second term is positive. For the first term to be
positive for α > 1 we need to show that
∂
∂α
∫ TE
TP
−G(s)e−(r+λ)(TE−t)ds < 0.
We use a perturbation argument. Suppose that we start from an equilibrium, where
b(TP|α) is debt at intervention and b(TE) is debt at default. First, notice that b(TE)
is set by the policy-maker independently of α (the ICC does not depend on the fiscal
rule). On the other hand, by altering the bond price, α affects the equilibrium debt at
intervention. Consider a marginal increase in α, keeping intervention fixed at the initial
equilibrium b(TP|α). Increasing α shifts down the market bond price in 1.33, hence
q(b(TP|α)|α + dα) < qP(b(TP)|α), ∀dα > 0. By proposition 6, it cannot be optimal
for the government to stop at b(TP|α), better to stop one instant before. Therefore, it
must be b(TP|α + dα) > b(TP|α) and (TE − TP|α + dα) > (TE − TP|α). Also, G(t) is
decreasing in α since for any given b˙(b(t)), the distance qP(b(t)) − q(b(t)|α + dα) >
qP(b(t))− q(b(t)|α) is increasing ∀b(t) ∈ [b(TP|α), b(TE)]. It follows that the derivative
has a negative sign.
2. Part 2.
For any b(TP) and dα > 0, q(b(TP)|α)− q(b(TP)|α+ dα) > 0. An higher α restricts the
inter-temporal budget constraint of the government. To sustain any given borrowing
plan {b˙(t)}TPt=0, the government will have to consume less. It follows that the welfare of
the government should be monotonically decreasing in α.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
1. Let α¯ be such that q(TP|α¯) = q(T), hence by the terminal conditions of the government
also b(TP|α¯) = b(T). It follows that, given that the government will face the same
bond price, the dynamic of the economy pre-intervention is exactly the same with and
without policy, hence ∆W(α¯, 0) = 0. Since intervention has positive net present value
over default (ICC > 0 ∀t ∈ [TP, TE]), it must be ∆V(α¯, 0) > 0. By equation 1.34, α¯ > 1.
2. Let α = 1, by equation 1.34 it follows immediately that ∆V(1, 0) = 0. By proposition 7,
Moreover ∆W(1, 0) > 0 since by proposition 7 ∆W(α, 0) is monotonically decreasing in
α and from above we know that ∆W(α¯, 0) = 0 for α¯ < 1.
3. By proposition (7) it follows immediately that the Pareto set is identified by α ∈ [1, α¯].
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B.1 Solution algorithm
Before calculating the debt limit distribution via Monte Carlo simulations, the absence of func-
tional forms for all the endogenous variables requires the solution of part of the non-linear
model (i.e., for the real wage, the inflation rate and the maximum tax rate), with numerical
methods. The solution is based on the monotone mapping method, developed by Coleman,
1991 and Davig, 2004, which discretizes the state space and conjectures candidate decision
rules that reduce the system to a set of first-order expectational difference equations. The deci-
sion rules for the real wage w∗t = f w(ψ1t ), the inflation rate pi∗t = f pi(ψ1t ) and the corresponding
maximum tax rate τ∗t = f τ(ψ1t ) are solved in the following steps.
1. Discretize the state space ψ1t = {At, νt, Gt, ηz, ηR} 1
2. For i = 1, 2, ..., make a guess for the decision rules ( f wg , f pig , f τg ) over the state space. If
i = 1, set ( f wg , f pig , f τg ) to their steady state values; if i > 1, set ( f wg , f pig , f τg ) to the solutions
in the previous iteration ( f wi−1, f
pi
i−1, f
τ
i−1).
3. At each grid point, solve the model and obtain the updated rule ( f wi , f
pi
i , f
τ
i ) using the
given rule ( f wi−1, f
pi
i−1, f
τ
i−1) as a guess. Given equations 3.4, 3.16, 3.22 and 3.24 to pin
down (nt,Υt, RFt , ct), respectively, use the model equations 3.5, 3.15 and 3.21 to solve the
non-linear model and determine the decision rules ( f wi , f
pi
i , f
τ
i ). In particular, maximize
3.21 subject to the non-linear constraints 3.5 and 3.15 and non-negativity constraints on
endogenous variables as appropriate. The integrals implied by the expectation terms
are evaluated using numerical quadrature. The exogenous AR(1) processes are ap-
proximated as first-order Markov processes according to the quadrature approach by
Tauchen and Hussey, 1991.
4. Notice that ( f wi−1, f
pi
i−1, f
τ
i−1) are assumed to be decision rules at t+1 when evaluating
expectations, as they provide a set of intra-temporally consistent solutions for the opti-
mising agents. To ensure that the solution is also inter-temporally consistent, establish
1The number of grid points and state variables actually considered can vary depeding on
the problem at hand, in order to deal with curse of dimensionality
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a rule to check convergence of the decision rules ( f wi , f
pi
i , f
τ
i ) and ( f
w
i−1, f
pi
i−1, f
τ
i−1) as
follows:
(a) if max{|( f wi , f pii , f τi )− ( f wi−1, f pii−1, f τi−1)| > 1e− 6}, go back to step 2;
(b) otherwise, ( f wi , f
pi
i , f
τ
i ) are the decision rules.
To solve the full model, the same algorithm is used, but with an enlarged state space that
embeds the stock of debt bt as a state variable.
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